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FBIS-USR-94-041

20 April 1994



## ***CENTRAL EURASIA***



# FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

FBIS-USR-94-041

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## POLITICAL AFFAIRS

### Lukyanov, Yakunin on Civil Accord

#### Lukyanov Sees Civil Accord Chances as Slim

944F0560A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian 29 Mar 94 p 1

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Anatoliy Lukyanov, Russian Road group, by Viktoria Rabotnova; place and date not given: "Prepare for October in the Spring"]

[Text] [Lukyanov] Civil peace is not all-forgiveness or universal fraternization. True patriots, our people, will never agree to make peace with those who have shell-blasted the parliament and the constitution. There will be no accord on this count.

Overall, accord in a society that is splitting into the poor and the rich is difficult. It is impossible to reconcile these contradictions on the social plane, but it is possible and necessary to attempt to resolve them without armed conflicts and bloodshed. Most people, including the communists, support precisely this. Such accord assumes a whole series of actions aimed at resolving all issues by consensus.

[Rabotnova] In other words, for you accord does not mean giving up the struggle?

[Lukyanov] One may wish for anything. But try to reconcile the poor—and even according to government data 38 percent of the Russian population live below the poverty level—with a handful of new millionaires. But we have to act within the bounds of the constitution.

[Rabotnova] Which constitution?

[Lukyanov] Even this one, essentially not adopted because only one-third of the population voted for it in the referendum. The struggle must be conducted by legal means. There are ways: strikes; speaking up against the regime in the press.

[Rabotnova] Your forecast: How will events develop from here on?

[Lukyanov] It all depends on the correlation of forces; on how realistically the president and his entourage appraise the current situation. Unless shock therapy is rejected; unless the reforms become at least minimally socially oriented, October may shift to other months...

#### Yakunin: Fate of Accord Up to Opposition

944F0560B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian 29 Mar 94 p 1

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Gleb Yakunin, Russia's Choice faction, by Viktoria Rabotnova; place and date not given: "Rejection of Class Struggle"]

[Text] [Yakunin] For us, democrats, the president's civil accord proposal was unexpected. I think there is only one sphere of life where such an accord may be attempted. It is an agreement for all political forces—first and foremost communists, patriots, and Zhirinovskiy followers—to give up the class struggle and violent methods.

That the president expressed a wish to consolidate society is wonderful. But realization of this idea requires systematic meetings with trade unions, including those in opposition; political parties; culture figures; and representatives of different religious confessions—not just the patriarch. Without a continuous dialogue, it will all end up as a purely propagandistic action.

I think that the practical result could resemble that in Spain, provided we were already in a state of getting out of the crisis...

[Rabotnova] But in Spain the victors forgave the defeated. What about here?

[Yakunin] We, the president's supporters, criticize him bitterly and tell the truth in that he has not implemented deep-reaching reforms, has not pushed through a law on vetting, and that for all practical purposes the current winners in our country are the army of bureaucrats. They will try to stay in power at any price, solidify it. And this is probably the greatest danger for democracy today.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Statute and Plan for Federation Council Activity

944F0541B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 4

[Decree No. 74-1 SF of Federation Council of Russian Federation Federal Assembly on council legislative activity up to 15 July 1994, signed by Chairman V.F. Shumeyko in Moscow on 15 March 1994, and schedule of council legislative initiatives]

[Text] After discussing the plan for Federation Council legislative activity up to 15 July 1994, with consideration for the Message from the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly "On the Reinforcement of the Russian State (Fundamental Guidelines of Domestic and Foreign Policy)," the Federation Council hereby decrees that:

1. The Schedule of Federation Council Legislative Initiatives up to 15 July 1994 (attached) is approved.
2. The Schedule of Federation Council Legislative Initiatives up to 15 July 1994 will be forwarded to the State Duma.
3. The committees of the Federation Council will consider the proposals made during the discussion of the Message from the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly during the drafting of proposals for the plan for Federation Council legislative activity for the second half of 1994.
4. The discussion of the plan for Federation Council legislative activity will be resumed after the State Duma has approved the schedule of legislative activity.

[Signed] V.F. Shumeyko, Chairman of Federation Council of Russian Federation Federal Assembly  
Moscow  
15 March 1994  
No 74-1 SF



## Schedule of Federation Council Legislative Initiatives up to 15 July 1994

Number	Working title of bill	Sponsor of bill	Council committee drafting bill	Status of bill	Date of submission to State Duma
<b>I. BILLS BASED ON PROPOSALS OF FEDERATION COUNCIL COMMITTEES AND DEPUTIES</b>					
<b>Bills on Amendments and Additions to Laws of Russian Federation</b>					
1	On Amendments and Additions to RF Law on Education	Federation Council	Committee on Science, Culture and Education	being drafted	second quarter of 1994
<b>Bills on Government Structure and Federal Relations</b>					
2	On Federal Government Agencies	Federation Council	Committee on Constitutional Law and Judicial Affairs	being drafted	June 1994
3	On Procedure and Sequence of Implementing Federation Treaty	Federation Council	Committee on Federation Affairs, Federation Treaty, and Regional Policy	being drafted	May 1994
4	On Federated Structure of Russian Federation	Federation Council	Committee on Federation Affairs, Federation Treaty, and Regional Policy	being drafted	June 1994
5	On Status of Member of Russian Federation	Federation Council	Committee on Federation Affairs, Federation Treaty, and Regional Policy	being drafted	June 1994
6	On Status of Kalinin-grad Oblast	Federation Council	Committee on Constitutional Law and Judicial Affairs	draft completed	April 1994
<b>Bills on Elections to State Governing Bodies and Local Government Agencies</b>					
7	Election Code of Russian Federation (note: being drafted in case Federation Council legislative initiative is not supported by State Duma or RF President)	Federation Council	Committee on Constitutional Law and Judicial Affairs	being drafted	June 1994
<b>Bills on Social Policy</b>					
8	Fundamentals of Legislation on Veterans	Federation Council Deputy R.S. Aushev	Committee on Security and Defense Issues	being drafted	June 1994
<b>Bills on Science, Culture, and Education</b>					
9	On Science	Federation Council	Committee on Science, Culture and Education	being drafted	second quarter of 1994
<b>II. BILLS BASED ON PROVISIONS OF MESSAGE OF RF PRESIDENT TO RF FEDERAL ASSEMBLY</b>					
<b>Bills on Science, Culture, and Education</b>					
10	On Higher and Post-VUZ Professional Education	Federation Council	Committee on Science, Culture and Education	being drafted	second quarter of 1994
<b>Bills on International Policy and Foreign Economic Activity</b>					
11	On Free Economic Zones of Russian Federation	Federation Council, RF Government	Committee on International Affairs; Committee on Economic Reform, Ownership, and Property Relations	sent to committees and commissions of Federation Council and State Duma on 25 February 1994	April 1994

**Schedule of Federation Council Legislative Initiatives up to 15 July 1994 (Continued)**

Number	Working title of bill	Sponsor of bill	Council committee drafting bill	Status of bill	Date of submission to State Duma
12	On Participation of RF Military Contingents in Peace-Keeping Operations, Including CIS, CSCE, and UN Operations	Federation Council, RF Government	Committee on International Affairs	being drafted	second quarter of 1994
13	On International Treaties of Russian Federation	Federation Council, RF President	Committee on International Affairs	sent to committees and commissions of Federation Council and State Duma	April 1994
14	On Status of Foreign Citizens in Russian Federation	Federation Council, RF Government	Committee on International Affairs	being drafted	second quarter of 1994
<b>III. BILLS BASED ON PROPOSALS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION MEMBERS</b>					
15	On Special Regional Programs (Compilation and Financial and Organizational Requisites of Special Regional Programs)	Perm Oblast	Committee on Economic Reform, Ownership, and Property Relations	to be drafted in second quarter of 1994	fourth quarter of 1994

**Decree, Statute on Economic Development of Yakutia**

944F0541A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 4

[Decree No 244 of Government of Russian Federation approving Status Report on Program for Socioeconomic Development of Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and Statute on Program Administration, signed by Chairman V. Chernomyrdin in Moscow on 29 March 1994, and addenda]

[Text] Pursuant to Edict No. 1249 of the President of the Russian Federation of 18 August 1993 "On Immediate Measures To Implement the Federation Treaty in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)," the Government of the Russian Federation hereby decrees that:

The status report on the Program for the Socioeconomic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), corresponding to Addendum 1, and the Statute on the Administration of the Program, corresponding to Addendum 2, submitted by the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) with the approval of concerned ministries and departments of the Russian Federation and examined by the president of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), are approved.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman of Government of Russian Federation

**Addendum 1. Status Report on Program for Socioeconomic Development of Sakha Republic (Yakutia)**

1. The Program for the Socioeconomic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), hereafter referred to as the program, is a federal program which was drafted in accordance with Edict No 1249 of the President of the Russian

Federation of 18 August 1993 "On Immediate Measures To Implement the Federation Treaty in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)" according to the procedure defined by Decree No 638 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 27 August 1992 "On the Organization of the Work To Implement the Law of the Russian Federation 'On Deliveries of Food and Goods for State Needs.'" The state client for the program is the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), and the program was drafted by the Economic Research Institute of the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics and the Yakut Scientific Center of the Siberian Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The program is intended to attain priority objectives providing for the mobilization of financial, credit, material, and other resources for the economic restructuring and social development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and was drawn up with a view to the interests of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), the Russian Federation, and other participants in the program.

The program was compiled with a view to the Program for the Restructuring of the Russian Economy During the Period up to 1995 and the Comprehensive Forecast of the Development and Distribution of Productive Forces in the Russian Federation During the Period up to 2000, as well as other special federal, interstate, and regional programs.

2. The main objectives of the program are the following:

the stable functioning, retooling, and further development of the fuel and energy complex to satisfy the needs of the economy of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Far Eastern economic region;

the establishment and development of the diamond processing, petroleum production, gas and petroleum refining, and other modern and highly effective fields of production

with a view to the mutual interests of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation;

the construction of the Berkakit-Tommot-Yakutsk railroad and other elements of the transportation infrastructure;

the conservation of natural resources and the resolution of ecological problems;

the technological support and development of the infrastructure of the agroindustrial complex in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), the establishment of production capacities for the processing of agricultural products and the development of droving horse breeding, reindeer breeding, the fur trade, and other traditional spheres of employment of the northern peoples, and the preservation of uniquely northern farming methods;

the augmentation of the export potential of the economy for the development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation;

the resolution of demographic problems, the problems of the population of some northern regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), and employment problems and the elevation of the standard of living.

3. The projects and undertakings envisaged by the program will be financed with the resources of the program implementation fund and contributions from the federal budget, the budget of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), and other sources, including foreign and domestic investments.

4. The drafting, coordination, and implementation of the program will be supervised by the program administration.

#### **Addendum 2. Statute on Administration of Program for Socioeconomic Development of Sakha Republic (Yakutia)**

1. The administration of the Program for the Socioeconomic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), hereafter referred to as the program administration, is the agency responsible for the drafting, coordination, and implementation of the Program for the Socioeconomic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), hereafter referred to as the program, and will perform the functions of the state client.

The program administration will be created in accordance with Edict No 1249 of the President of the Russian Federation of 18 August 1993 "On Immediate Measures To Implement the Federation Treaty in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)," will have the status of a juridical person, and will be guided in its activities by the laws of the Russian Federation and the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and by this statute.

2. The program administration will do the following:

plan and carry out measures to mobilize financial, credit, material, and other resources for the attainment of program objectives and manage the financial resources allocated specifically for projects and undertakings envisaged by the program;

create structural subdivisions and mechanisms with the approval of agencies of the executive branch of government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) to secure the drafting and implementation of the program and prepare the necessary legal instruments and other documents for its implementation;

plan projects and undertakings for the implementation of the program, evaluate their cost effectiveness, and calculate their costs; compile requests, according to the established procedure and with the necessary substantiation, for resource allocations each fiscal year;

supervise the performance of scientific research services for the program, arrange for the drafting of plans and estimates and for the technical-economic projects and expert appraisals required for the program, award program contracts, and distribute the funds for them;

coordinate the program with other programs to be implemented within the territory of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia).

3. Within the confines of its jurisdiction, the program administration will be empowered to do the following:

approve the technical and economic feasibility studies required by the program for geological explorations for fuel and energy, rare-earth, and other crude resources and for the exploitation of mineral deposits with the consent of the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, enlist the services of ministries and departments of the Russian Federation and the appropriate scientific organizations in this work, make the arrangements for international contacts, and make decisions on the encouragement of foreign investors to finance specific projects and undertakings envisaged by the program and to develop and exploit mineral deposits within the territory of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia);

submit proposals to the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Government of the Russian Federation on program adjustments, the improvement of program standards, the attraction of additional funding, and other matters connected with the drafting and implementation of the program.

4. The program administration will submit annual reports to the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Government of the Russian Federation on the progress in carrying out the program and on the use of funds from the budget of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the federal budget for its implementation.

5. The program administration structure will be determined by the nature of program objectives and the need to coordinate the interests of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation, will envisage the collective form of decisionmaking, and will include a representative body—the program board of administrators—and an executive body—the program board of directors.

The members of the program board of administrators will include representatives of agencies of the executive branch



of government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation. Their appointment will be ratified by the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Government of the Russian Federation respectively. The number of appointments to be ratified by these governments should be equal.

The chairman of the program board of administrators will be the chairman of the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia).

The staff roster and estimated expenditures of the board of directors will be approved by the program board of administrators.

The costs of maintaining the program administration will be financed by the program implementation fund.

The satisfaction of the physical and consumer needs and the transportation and medical services of program administration personnel will be secured on the basis of contracts, according to the procedure and on the terms established for the appropriate categories of personnel of ministries of the Russian Federation and agencies of the executive branch of government of Russian Federation members.

#### Maritime Kray Finds Funds for Elections

944F0561A Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 9 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Vitaliy Mogil: There Is Money. We Await the Elections"]

[Text] In order to report on the trip to the Central Election Commission in Moscow and answer questions that had accumulated during their absence, Chairman of the Kray Election Commission S. Knyazev and Ye. Khrustalev assembled journalists in the White House the day before yesterday.

It appears from what they said that the decision of the governor of the kray concerning delaying the elections to the kray Duma until autumn made sense to the Central Election Commission. They also did not fail to pay attention to the financial needs of Maritime Kray regarding the conduct of elections. The necessary amount of money was released. Thus, the kray election commission was able to return half a billion rubles [R] to the kray budget, from where the money was borrowed to finance the initial stages of the election campaign, and which the governor also promised to release for social programs.

S. Knyazev dispelled the concerns of journalists about the safekeeping of the money allocated for the elections postponed until autumn. But so that the millions will be safer, he will probably even cancel a trip to Moscow, where on 20 April the Supreme Court plans to examine an appeal filed by Messrs Gilgenberg, Kandarakov, and Isayev concerning the, in their opinion, improper cutting up of electoral districts. According to the law, the complaint can be examined even in the absence of representatives of the kray election commission.

As for the Supreme Court finding on the essence of the complaint, the delay of the elections to a later date only contributes to objectivity. In the words of S. Knyazev, such a subjective factor as an already elected kray Duma would complicate the work of justice.

Mentioning that we all walk under God, the visitors explained the situation regarding the candidates for deputy who are already registered. This is how matters stand: If 55 days before the scheduled date of the elections there are less than two candidates for deputy in any electoral district for any reason whatsoever, a prenomination mandatory collection of signatures will be held as before.

It was decided not to change the composition of the kray and district election commissions. They will continue their work.

#### Russia's Choice on Goals in Maritime Kray

944F0561B Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 9 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Ilya Grinchenko, chairman of the kray organizational committee of the Russia's Choice Movement, by Vitaliy Mogil; place and date not given: "Orientation Points of the New Party: Maritime Kray Gaydar Supporters Plan To Defend Civic Peace and the Interests of the Residents of the Kray"]

[Text] A long time ago journalists used to "pester" the leader of Russia's Choice, Ye. Gaydar, with the question: Are you not planning to transform this bloc of yours into a party? Yegor Timurovich never ruled out such a possibility. And so, it has happened—Russia's Choice will create a party. Supporters were found for it here in Maritime Kray.

Our KRASNOYE ZNAMYA correspondent met with Ilya Grinchenko, chairman of the kray organizational committee of the Russia's Choice Movement.

[Mogil] Ilya Konstantinovich, the political announcement on the creation of a party, which was published in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and signed by its leaders, states that the party is being created as a counterweight to the threat of a nomenklatura revanche and the accession to power of national-extremists. Does such a threat also exist in Maritime Kray?

[Grinchenko] Maritime Kray is still not a separate republic. But in Russia such a danger is viewed as obvious, and this means that our kray is also not secure from it. But even this is not the main reason for the creation of a party. Russia's Choice will fight not against, but for. For a free society where human rights are the highest priority, for stability, for an effective state, and for civic peace.

[Mogil] The establishment of civic peace and the creation of a free society, it must be assumed, are a program maximum. But the minimum?

[Grinchenko] For Maritime Kray supporters of People's Choice, this is a struggle for authority in all representative organs in order to defend the interests of the residents of our kray.



[Mogil] Can we also expect your candidates in the forthcoming elections to the kray Duma?

[Grinchenko] We have supporters among already nominated candidates for deputy. But if the Statute on Elections is revised and the opportunity appears to nominate new candidates, then we will do this.

[Mogil] Who was the initiator for the creation of the party in Maritime Kray?

[Grinchenko] The slogans under which the new party is being created found support among members of the Democrat Club—people of a different political orientation. Among them are social-democrats, supporters of the Russia's Choice Movement, and people with no party affiliation.

[Mogil] Will they all now become Gaydarites?

[Grinchenko] The party has not yet been formed structurally. Its constituent assembly is planned for the end of May. Until that time it will be necessary to consider the draft charter and a political statement. After the congress, party supporters will be able to formulate their attitude toward the documents developed by it at constituent meetings in the localities. Moreover, participation in the activity of the Russia's Choice Movement is not limited to party membership.

[Mogil] The party has just been formed, but it has already actively joined the political life of the kray...

[Grinchenko] Yes. On behalf of the kray organizational conference of the Russia's Choice Movement, an appeal has been sent to the governor of Maritime Kray with a proposal to form a kray public chamber (as a consultative representational organ under the kray administration) consisting of registered candidates for deputy for the period before the election of the kray Duma. We think that this could become the first step in the establishment of civic peace and accord in Maritime Kray, and we declare our readiness to render support in the implementation of our proposal.

#### **Maritime Kray Governor Interviewed**

944F0544A Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 1

[Interview with Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, governor of Maritime Kray, by Yelena Belykh: "Extricating Ourselves From the Captivity of Dead Schemes"]

[Text] Despite all of life's burdens which fall to the lot of the "average" Maritimer, one virtue of existence in the province by the sea is indisputable—things are tranquil here. The political battles in the capital roll down to us in gentle waves, fortunately. But the social peace is fragile.

In terms of per capita income the Maritime area is in last place in the region. The gap between rich and poor is growing. A bank employee receives 2.5 times more than a worker, three times more than a teacher, and four times more than a peasant. The two minimums—wage and subsistence—differ from one another tens of times over. How to beat back the wave of growing social tension and

prevent the eruption of a "rebellion senseless and pitiless"? Our correspondent took this question to a surgery on personal matters at the residence of Ye. Nazdratenko, governor of the kray.

[Belykh] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, on her resignation Ella Pamilova, minister of social protection, told the press that she could not deceive people. The government was adopting another decree, as a result of which a quantity of water-marked notes would be printed. They are distributed to the poor, but frequently only when prices have exceeded the posted price many times over. What is there for needy Maritimers to hope for?

[Nazdratenko] The realism of government decrees is a painful subject. Is there, say, a decree on privileges for the casualties from the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station? Yes, and very handsome it is. Has the government allocated the region money? Not one ruble. People are coming to us, to the administration, for help—there is no money. Is there a decree on officers discharged into the reserve, on apartments being built for them? Yes. And there is inflation, which is devouring the funds which were at one time allocated. One apartment instead of five—that's the arithmetic. The list could be continued ad infinitum. Take if only the first edict of the president on education and the way it has been fulfilled.

All this cannot fail to stoke the people's exasperation. This runs counter to my inner convictions, incidentally. Remember one of the numerous promises of Gaydar—the favorite of young people and the West, the personification of progressive thinking? "Only bikers will feel the increase in the price of fuel." It has been felt by retirees—the most defenseless group of society. We, the kray, have been able to cover them, reduce the prices, and allow gasoline benefits. We are posting the militia, we are posting the Special Militia so that the elderly individual may fill up in peace and not be humiliated by the "leather" boys. And? He rides away, and half a kilometer further on that same junior mafioso stops him and siphons off the gasoline. Who is to blame?

[Belykh] Nazdratenko, naturally. When people voted for the new constitution, for continuation of the reforms, they voted for you also.

[Nazdratenko] I am not sure that if a ballot were conducted now, I would collect as many white balls. But I would ask people to believe in one thing—the sincerity of my motives when I attempt to do something. We are working on a decree on the economic status of the kray. We are not demanding direct financial infusions into a moribund economy. But release us from the captivity of dead schemes born of anonymous government officials somewhere in Moscow! Afford us an opportunity to manage preferential quantity regulation and licensing! The Yaroslavskiy Mining and Concentrating Works is at a standstill—people have no earnings, the community is dying. Grant it the opportunity to sell products in a profitable manner, and people will have money. Money, not "compensation payments." The infrastructure would be restored, the social sphere would revive.

[Belykh] The same hopes were placed in Government Decree 1001.

[Nazdratenko] True. But who torpedoed this decree? It was buried here, in the Maritime region, by Bytov and Cherepkov. I was accused of blackmailing the government. The same thing will probably be repeated with the decree. According to the principle: "If a man exists, you can pin something on him." The business of the tanker filled with radioactive waste. "Nazdratenko is lobbying a Japanese company!" Very well, you don't want a cleanup by the Japanese for free, within 20 days? Accept the alternative—18 months of construction for over \$2 million. But the kray would not pay this. I have no intention of taking crumbs from pensions and children's compensation to pay some firm in Moscow for secretaries and private residences.

Yes, I am a lobbyist. I lobby for the interests of the Maritimers. Only not those who roll around in Mercedes and talk with competitors in the language of lampoons and grenades. The interests of normal working people, who bring their troubles to my surgery. Whom we, the authorities, are required to provide with a normal peaceful life.

#### **Radioactive Waste Dumping Developments**

944F0544B Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 1

[I. Mikhaylov report: "In the Sea of Japan, for All That! That's Where Our Liquid Radioactive Waste Will End Up, It Would Seem"]

[Text] Journalists of Vladivostok and also foreign correspondents accredited in the kray center satisfied themselves of this once again at a news conference conducted by Ye. Stomatyuk, chairman of the Natural Resources Committee of the administration of the kray. It is he, incidentally, who was head of the kray interdepartmental commission inspecting the state of radiation safety in the handling of radioactive waste at the Zvezda Plant, which was in the city of Bolshoy Kamen on 30 March of this year.

Quite a lot has already been written about this problem (KRASNOYE ZNAMYA of 17 February, "Nuclear Scrapes," and of 31 March, "Large Dollar Sum for Moscow," and a mass of publications in the local and central papers), and I will emphasize merely that the above commission reached yet again the conclusion concerning the impossibility of the storage of liquid radioactive waste in the current tanks in direct proximity to a center of population. The situation has deteriorated particularly at TNT-5, at which leaks were discovered. A real threat of radioactive contamination hangs over the waters of the Gulf of Ussuriysk and Bolshoy Kamen Bay, especially since the development of an emergency situation is expected in April-May with the arrival of settled warmth.

The commission recommended in May that the liquid radioactive waste be dumped in the Sea of Japan at the points determined in the 1980's. It had not been considered possible doing this earlier on account of the fact that the liquid radioactive waste had frozen to a thickness of 60-70 cm. And, second, the urgent building of repositories

and an industrial plant for decontaminating and reprocessing the liquid radioactive waste.

The first recommendation could be canceled if in the very near future Moscow either allocates the funds for the designated construction or permits Japanese firms to embark on the realization of their own proposals. In this case the tankers would temporarily be taken to a place presenting no danger to people's lives.

Journalists had attempted to take part in the work of the commission, incidentally, but the Pacific Fleet representative barred them from the liquid radioactive waste storage sites. And the question at the news conference as to whether the Pacific Fleet would submit to a decision of the administration on the dumping of liquid radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan if such were adopted was not inappropriate in this connection. According to the constitution, the fleet is required to submit inasmuch as local authorities are entitled, when it comes to questions of the environment, to adopt independent decisions. But Russia has yet to act so rectilinearly in accordance with the law. It is not known what Moscow will tell the Pacific Fleet.

The work force of the Zvezda Plant and the population of the city of Bolshoy Kamen will have something to say also, for that matter. Their opinion cannot be relegated to the last positions, I believe.

#### **Novosibirsk Unemployment Figures Cited**

944F0572A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR  
in Russian 13 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by V. Naymushin, chief of the Novosibirsk Oblast Center for the Employment of the Population Department of Labor Market Analysis and Employment Programs: "The Number of Unemployed Is Growing (Analysis of 1991-1994 Data From the Oblast Center for the Employment of the Population)"]

[Text] The number of unemployed people is growing in the rayons of the oblast. In 1993, 13,500 unemployed were put on the rolls there, and in the preceding year, 7,000.

Last year, 7,600 unemployed were put on the rolls, compared to 9,300 in 1992.

For the January-February period of 1994, the number of unemployed put on the rolls, compared to the corresponding period of last year, came to 155.7 percent in the rayons of the oblast, 122.0 percent in Novosibirsk, and 142.4 percent in the oblast as a whole.

The competition among the unemployed for vacant jobs is growing, especially in the rayons of the oblast. As of 1 March 1993, 21 unemployed claimed each vacant job in the oblast rayons, compared to six; as of the corresponding date of last year in the city of Novosibirsk, accordingly, one and three, and in the oblast as a whole, three and four unemployed per vacant job.

The proportion of unemployed residing in rural areas increased in 1993 (from 12.7 percent as of 1 January to 21.7 percent on 31 December). Those who had previously

worked in the national economy accounted for 86 percent of the total number of unemployed. On the whole, the

following dynamics of the qualitative composition of the unemployed people has been registered:

	1-1-93	1-1-94
a) by reason for unemployment (percentages):		
—laid-off employees	62.8	45.0
—quit of their own will	22.4	39.3
—dismissed for violations of labor discipline	0.7	1.6
—college graduates	9.2	11.3
b) by age:		
—young people between 16 and 29	32.1	34.5
—individuals close to retirement age	5.3	6.7
c) those who have had a break in work of more than one year and those who have not previously embarked on labor activities	12.5	22.6
d) those without profession or occupation	7.2	12.7
e) by the duration of unemployment		
—eight months or longer	3.9	31.6

Higher requirements by employers with regard to the level of qualification of the employees and newly hired citizens have hampered job placement activities on behalf of the groups of population in particular need of social protection. It is obvious that the number of parents rearing minor or congenitally handicapped children, single parents, and parents of many children increased in 1993 among the unemployed precisely in conjunction with this.

Last year, the number of unemployed parents rearing minor children, as well as congenitally handicapped children, in the oblast increased from 4,300 to 5,500 people, and that of parents of many children, from 312 to 524 persons, respectively. This growth occurred only in the rayons (cities) of the oblast, whereas the number of such persons in Novosibirsk virtually did not change (2,400 people).

The proportion of parents who have minor children or congenitally handicapped children, in the total number of unemployed is greater in the rayons of the oblast than in Novosibirsk, and comes to 42.4 percent and 41.6 percent, respectively.

#### Refugees and Forced Resettlers

In 1993, the employment service of the oblast registered a total of 145 such citizens, including 103 women. Thirty-five persons were placed in jobs, including 24 women.

#### The Size of Unemployment Benefits

The average annual size of unemployment benefits in Novosibirsk Oblast, with payments for all dependents (including children), came to 2,385 rubles (R) in 1992, and R24,627 per unemployed person in 1993. The allowance for each dependent comes to 10 percent of the size of the benefit.

#### The Results of the Implementation of the Main Provisions of Employment Programs for 1993

A certain relaxation of strains on the labor market of the oblast in 1993 was the main result of carrying out the program for facilitating the employment of the population. Last year, the employment service operated on the labor market more effectively than in the previous year. The number of nonworking citizens placed in jobs by the service increased by 12.8 percent, the number of those referred for vocational training—by 263 percent, and the number of those enlisted in public works—by a factor of 30.

[Signed] V. Naymushin, chief of the department of labor market analysis and employment programs.

#### Tatar Nationalists Hold Plenum, State Goals

944F0561C Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA  
in Russian 9 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Ayaz Khasanov: "TOTs Intends To Come to Power"]

[Text] As IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA has reported, the cochairmen of the Tatar Social Center [TOTs] held a news conference in Kazan on the subject "The Future of the National Movement."

One of the leaders of the TOTs, Maro Shamsutdinov, acquainted journalists with the decisions of the last plenum of the social center, which openly proclaimed a new objective—coming to power. Moreover, it was emphasized: only by constitutional means. Up to the present TOTs had not put forth such a slogan, and has generally not engaged in the struggle for power. It also endeavored to resolve questions of the federalization of Russia. In the opinion of the organizers of the news conference there has been no real federalism in the Russian Federation, there is none, and it seems there will not be any; it has remained a unitary state.



For this reason, the leaders of the national movement cannot concur with the fact of the signing of the treaty between Tatarstan and Russia, which preserves the centralized distribution of a planned economy. But what is dangerous, TOTs members think, is not the treaty, which actually is more of a political nature, but intergovernmental agreements that are reinforced by the treaty. TOTs cannot agree at all with the 12 agreements in which the direct implementation of the treaty is laid out. And it does not share the position of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, which remains silent when the executive organs sign an interstate treaty. Early elections to parliament, TOTs representatives think, are simply necessary inasmuch as the legislative organ is not coping with its functions.

In the opinion of the leaders of the national movement, the formation of a new personnel policy plays a not unimportant role. Up to now this question is being resolved in secrecy. But what is needed, first and foremost, is the appointment of heads of administration through elections. Otherwise they will remain officials with unlimited authority over which there is no control.

The TOTs leaders intend also to engage in the destatization of the mass media, as they are convinced that they are strictly subordinated today to the power structures.

Regarding the question of a split in the leadership of the national movement, Rashat Safin informed journalists of the decision of the plenum to declare a moratorium on criticism and fighting among themselves. "For the sake of the nation's interests, we must be together, especially since our views have never differed on the main thing."

#### **Tatar Official on Economic Reform Failures**

944F0567A Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA  
in Russian 13 Apr 94 p 1

[Interview with Ravil Muratov, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan, by INTERFAX correspondent Guzel Fazullina, especially for IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA, under the rubric "Point of View"; place and date not given: "Ravil Muratov: 'Assertions About Prosperity in Tatarstan Are Still Far From the Truth'"]

[Text] Having signed a package of intergovernmental agreements with Russia, Tatarstan [lines missing as received] according a greater degree of economic freedom. However, even during the two years in which negotiations were underway and the republic insisted on its "special position, special status," the leadership had an opportunity to pursue its own economic policy, which could be somewhat different from that of Russia. How fully did the government of Tatarstan take advantage of this opportunity to conduct reforms? Did it not restrict itself to social programs and support for rural areas from the budget, failing to provide conditions for transformations in the agrarian sector?

Ravil Muratov, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan, answers this and other questions in an interview by an INTERFAX correspondent.

[Fazullina] The advantages of the policy of a "soft" entry into a market economy, which Tatarstan has opted for, are obvious. The government has succeeded in somewhat cushioning the shock of a cataclysmic price liberalization and halting a drop in production in the agrarian sector. However, both the programs of targeted social protection and financial infusions for the rural areas were effected at the expense of the budget and oil exports. The current nonpayment crisis, the tax burden, and a decline in world prices for oil call into doubt these traditional sources of financing for the republic. What lies ahead for the economy of Tatarstan?

[Muratov] Unfortunately, the government has actually let go of long-term programs while it has focused its attention on social programs and supported the rural areas, i.e. it has fought to survive in an elementary fashion. Independent exports of oil have indeed helped to somewhat contain a complete collapse in the economy. However, relative stability is merely a launching pad for the beginning of reforms, first of all of the financial and tax systems and in the agrarian sector. We were among the first to put into circulation bills of exchange that were to mitigate the nonpayment crisis and the absence of centralized credit resources. However, the extensive use of bills of exchange was hampered by banks, primarily the National Bank: It is more advantageous for it to deal with ringing cash rather than bills of exchange, and to collect a high percentage of profits for the Central Bank of Russia. Enterprises did not receive bills of exchange well, either. We wasted time and an opportunity. Russian banks are introducing bills of exchange now; we must say that they are doing far better than we are.

We are beginning to plainly fall behind some regions which develop their programs. Our enterprises are bogged down in the quagmire of nonpayments, but they are persistently clinging to the old pattern for settlements. The government has been forced to allocate billions from the budget for Nizhnekamskneftekhim Joint-Stock Company to pay its debts to Tatneft. However, one enterprise carries on the technological sequence of the other. It is possible to make arrangements with the oilmen for settlements after the finished products of petrochemistry are sold! Alas, each of them prefers to be awash in his own debts.

The government embarks on quite costly social programs, which in and of itself is a favorable fact. However, one gets the impression that we do not quite care about forming real sources of funding for them, primarily the budget. Who is going to pay taxes? Enterprises that are indebted to one another? Entrepreneurs who are smothered by the tax press to such a degree that it is time to wind down production? Kolkhozes and sovkhoses that draw subsidies and are unprofitable for the most part?

We are wasting the time and the opportunity of conducting reforms with smaller losses. Our rural areas are still unaffected by transformations. The government continues to invest billions in the rural areas by supporting unprofitable farms, whereas it should implement land reform, introduce private ownership of land, as is laid down in the Constitution, and transfer it to those who will be able to



operate profitably. However, here [lines missing as received] owner-operated farming. As a result, meat sold by private traders at markets costs as much as state meat in the stores. In the future, it is going to get still worse. Not billions, but rather trillions, of rubles will be needed in the fall when we have to pay for finished products. What kind of budget can bear this? We should encourage those who want to and are capable of managing efficiently rather than support the bankrupt at the expense of the taxpayer.

[Fazullina] What stood in the way of the government developing a program for the support of private business in both the rural and urban areas? At present, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast has no more rights and powers than Tatarstan, but it is precisely its format of agrarian reform that is being proposed as a model. Governor Boris Nemtsov did not seek special powers in the conduct of foreign economic operations; nonetheless, the West is now prepared to invest capital in the economy of the oblast, including the development of small business....

[Muratov] Perhaps it was our conservatism, deliberation, the desire to take a close look at Russian reforms and to avoid mistakes. However, at the same time we allowed our own mistakes to occur by failing to develop a concept of economic development. We talked a lot about supporting small- and medium-size businesses, having failed to take any practical steps at the same time. As early as one year ago, the need was obvious to provide conditions and a system of preferences for the priority development of the business infrastructure—banks, leasing, marketing, and brokerage companies. At present, many small- and medium-size banks are on the brink of bankruptcy, despite the high rates of interest on credit. Can we count on production developing under such circumstances? Can we expect a surge of entrepreneurship as we set excessively high taxes? Can we count on the prompt emergence of a class of medium-size entrepreneurs if in our republic, merchants and businessmen are virtually on a par with criminal elements in public consciousness? The government is not the only one to contribute its share of conservatism. Alas, our parliament is not particularly radical either, as it passes a law forbidding the managers of enterprises to engage in entrepreneurship or proposes to close down commercial stands. And what about the primary accumulation of capital?

As far as our independence in foreign economic operations is concerned, so far it has, unfortunately, existed on paper for the most part; we are yet to defend real rights. I will give examples. Recently, exclusive rights to transport and export oil through the port of Odessa were assigned to the Russian company Koneks by a directive of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation, notwithstanding the fact that agreements signed with both Russia and Ukraine provide for the free and unhindered movement of freight, including oil, through the territories of both countries, and that Tatarstan has the right to independently engage in foreign economic activities. They are trying to dictate their terms to us nonetheless.

Export and import duties are established by the Russian Government. What real guarantees of the repatriation of

capital can we give to foreign investors under the circumstances? Moreover, even government programs are being frustrated because of an increase in customs duties; we cannot import telecommunications equipment.

I would not like to paint an excessively gloomy picture, but assertions about prosperity in Tatarstan are still far from the truth, even if our indicators are somewhat better than those of our neighbors. We should not give in to the illusion of a better tomorrow if we are virtually standing in place at present. The treaty has been signed; the agreements have been concluded. At present, it is very important to take full advantage of the rights granted to us and to ensure unconditional compliance with all agreements.

#### **Magadan Oblast Official Sees Privatization as Local Issue**

944E0674B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Yudin, deputy chairman of the Magadan Oblast Property Fund, by Vladimir Androsenko, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* reporter, Magadan: "The North is Not Rushing to Applaud Chubays"]

[Text] The Federal Assembly must give territories the right to make their own decisions regarding privatization, says Vladimir Yudin, deputy chairman of the Magadan Oblast Property Fund. A *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent talks with him.

[Yudin] I would like to begin with a comparison. As we know, in the Far North nature is extremely fragile. The wounds that it suffers take decades to heal. Just as capable of being wounded is the north's particular economy, which is based on mining and fishing. Production, which is a single technological process, reacts to network violations by declining, and this has a severe effect on workers. Such ruptures are the result of too hurried privatization "according to the Chubays method," which is characterized not by economic expediency but by a practice well-known to us from the past - that of the company campaign, of the most rapid 100-percent seizure.

Unfortunately, in many parts of Russia it is too late to stop and look into matters because everything has been given away. But that is not the case here. In Magadan Oblast privatization has proceeded slowly until now. The first to be subject to it were trade, the consumer sphere, and transportation. The foundation, however—ore concentration combines and the fish industry—remained untouched. For us this was a good chance to preserve our economic potential. I feel that the oblast дума and oblast administration, in developing a privatization plan for 1994, will be obliged to make corrections that are directed at raising its effectiveness.

[Androsenko] In your opinions, what should be the priorities?

[Yudin] First of all it should be noted that the idea of voucher privatization has suffered a crash. Meanwhile, the powers that be are forcefully pushing the voucher variant.

Why? The answer is obvious—this is advantageous to our nouveau riche, to those who have amassed a great deal of money through speculation and other criminal activities, who bought up vouchers at an inexpensive price, and who, taking advantage of corruption, became the overseers of the most profitable enterprises. I think that the rejection of voucher privatization and the transition to routine privatization using money will be more fruitful.

The second question—monopolies and “key” enterprises. Is it efficient, let us say, to put the only Nefteprodukt [Petroleum product] enterprise in the oblast into private hands when it has at its disposal all fuel capacities and fuel lines in the territory? Pilots, automobile drivers and villagers are now dependent on it, but the possibilities for regulating its operations at least in some way have already been lost.

Or let us take transportation by motor vehicle. Practically all motor-transport depots in the oblast have been privatized and control over solutions to general territorial problems has been lost. The tragedy of the frozen village of Yagodnyy had a great deal to do, I think, with the impossibility of interesting private car owners in transporting coal.

[Androsenko] Vladimir Dmitriyevich, the first stage has practically been completed. What will the consequences be?

[Yudin] One of them will be the fragmenting of government property into small parts with an inadequate level of management and responsibility. In our oblast we have not heard of any privatized enterprises that have begun to work more productively or dependably. As far as I know the same is true all over Russia.

A second important consideration is that the country is being deprived of a normal labor market. Take a look. A furious emphasis is being placed on property owners. Moreover, this is done with reference to Western society. Yet this is not true. In the West the majority of the population is comprised not of owners but of ordinary people who work for someone else and who receive a dignified remuneration for their work. As a rule, owners there have assets to develop production and pay workers. Here the labor collective, having exchanged 51 percent of stock for vouchers, must supply and develop production as well as supply its own needs, but it does not have the assets to do this. Basically, the government is simply freeing itself of the responsibility for the fates of millions of people. I do not believe that this is right and I think it will have a considerable negative impact on reform.

Our stockholders often do not even understand the real cost of fixed AO [joint-stock company] capital, of investments and degree of dependability. They are bewitched by the round figures of promised dividends and no one cares about anything else.

[Androsenko] Yes, television pictures of Muscovites storming the offices of Oibk when stock was issued seemed

symptomatic to me. Such things do not occur here. Is it that northerners are more prone to analysis or is it simply hard to get them moving?

[Yudin] The main thing here is that northerners were first among Russians to face the uncertainty of tomorrow. In the Far North we can see with special clarity the gap between the pretty stories of radical reformers and the actual situation. Here geology, building and agriculture have been almost completely destroyed, gold extraction is on the decline and mining towns are closing. Under such conditions it is difficult to expect people to invest assets in enterprises that can become bankrupt at any time.

There have been a few things that have put us on the alert. The Russian Privatization Program for 1994 was passed without the participation of representatives and without summarizing 1993 results. Judging by A. Chubays' statements, such an analysis would be undesirable for him, and it is understandable that he would attempt to keep it from a vote.

Meanwhile, the privatization process is acquiring more of an administrative and command nature. It is strange that the directives of the former Gosplan [State Planning Committee] are considered bad while those of Goskominushchestvo [State Property Committee] are looked upon as good. And it is not important that the word “directive” somehow does not correspond to A. Chubays' favorite word—“market.” For example, despite the order from above, for over a year now we have been unable to sell all of the stock of Khasynskiy Building Materials Plant—the population will not buy it. On the other hand, the hurried fulfillment of last year's presidential decree on selling motor vehicle enterprises by 1 August, in my opinion had a negative effect on the situation in the oblast. In other words, a clear transition from one administrative system to another, and one that is even more severe, is evident.

We feel it is essential that the Federal Assembly make a decision that will give territories the right to deal with basic questions involving privatization. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to privatize enterprises and to place them into private hands, but not in the way that Chubays demands, wholesale, and by the end of the first six months of the year without fail. We wish to implement matters openly, without fuss, and to the greatest advantage for the working man, the new owner and the government.

#### Yaroslavl's Fight Against Organized Crime Reviewed

944F0564A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian  
6 Apr 94 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Semenov, personal correspondent (Yaroslavl): “Tea Party in the ‘Golden Bear,’ or Why Organized Crime Calls Yaroslavl a ‘Sweet City’”]

[Text] *My friends advised me right away to forget the whole thing, but I kept remembering a statement by Lt. Col. Kh. Alyautdinov: “I find myself wondering why and for whom we are doing all of this. Whom are we protecting? I have the sense that no one wants this.” I understood not only what he*

*said, but also what he chose not to say. That is why I went to the most exclusive and ominous bar in Yaroslavl—the "Golden Bear."*

The building, which is located in an neglected park, has no external appeal whatsoever. In fact, it looks like a painted shed, but as soon as I walked up to the door, it opened and a young man with an athletic build asked politely from inside: "May I help you?" After hearing that I wanted to see the director, he stepped aside and courteously helped me remove my coat. I entered a luxurious room, tastefully decorated with modern furniture and the finest china and glassware, and also...with soft and soothing music playing in the background. An attractive long-legged waitress brought me a cup of coffee, an orange, a glass of water, and...a check for 3,540 rubles.

According to reports received by the organized crime-fighting division of the Yaroslavl Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, the main black marketeers and criminal "authorities" were supposed to meet here for a "convention." They were supposed to agree on the division of economic spheres of influence and reach a consensus on certain areas of controversy. The Moscow bosses and representatives of the Georgian and Chechen Mafia were expected as guests. This interregional meeting was viewed by the Yaroslavl police as an exceptionally disturbing event. After all, the experience of other cities, not to mention Yaroslavl itself, indicated that "conferences" of this kind frequently culminated in bloody confrontations.

The Yaroslavl Organized Crime-Fighting Division began planning an operation to cut the "convention" short and arrest the guests of the exclusive bar. The rapid-response team which had been created specifically for the apprehension of armed criminals in emergency situations would be part of the operation. The detectives knew the time and place of the gang leaders' meeting, and they were even "accompanying" the bosses all the way from Moscow. The crime world had responded quickly to the creation of the new subdivision fighting organized crime and had established a reliable system of defense against the infiltration of their top ranks by MVD personnel.

At around 1600 hours the guests began arriving at the family tavern of Ye. Karpova. They ordered tea at first, and then cold appetizers and meat. The family dinner began. By that time the personnel of the special subdivision had entered the kitchen and had dashed from there into the main dining room. Within 30 or 40 seconds they were leading the visitors out of the bar and asking for their identification papers, filming the whole operation with a video camera. It was a motley crew: former Komsomol personnel, prominent athletes, and novice businessmen. In all, 32 people were detained, including 10 "chiefs" from Moscow, 12 residents of Chechnya, and 10 representatives of Yaroslavl commercial groups and their companions.

Unfortunately, the success of the raid was minimal. Because no one was armed (although there was a weapon in an old Zaporozhets parked near the bar, according to some reports), no one could be charged with a crime, and the police had to release all of the "innocent diners." I

think they did this grudgingly. After all, they know all about the present activities and the criminal past of many of the people who were detained. Just four of them had spent a total of a quarter of a century behind bars.

Knowing this, however, is not the same as being able to take action within the law. Organized crime is a complex structure today, enveloping our whole society like a cobweb. Furthermore, its social base is growing broader. By constantly augmenting its covert economic relations, it has already turned into a threat to the system of public administration. The organization of the old crime world, which was based on concealment from society, is undergoing rapid renovation. The strong will of the leaders of organized crime is combined with intelligence, and they are excellent organizers, psychologists, and economists. Furthermore, the people behind them are absolutely respectable gentlemen who are almost above suspicion.

That is the reason for the minimal results, and sometimes even the outright failures, that provide the grounds for the contradictory evaluations of police performance. The events in the "Golden Bear" demonstrate all of the complexity and depth of the criminals' social mimicry. "Golden Bear" proprietress Ye. Karpova, for instance, is an expert at impersonating a victim.

"This bar belongs to my private firm 'Katerina,'" she explained. "Our clients have always been respectable. We never let suspicious people in. Yes, our bar is frequented by local 'authorities,' and we know them, but can you name a bar they do not frequent?..."

Of course, the proprietress of the "Golden Bear" immediately filed a complaint with the procuracy, accusing the police of beating her daughter, Yu. Pautova, who was working in the kitchen at that time. The Kirovskiy Rayon Procuracy charged the police with exceeding their authority. Deputy Chief Kh. Alyautdinov of the Organized Crime-Fighting Division publicly acknowledged that "the operation might have been conducted with more finesse, but our boys in the special subdivision do not have that much experience. All of the cafe owners' complaints about their behavior were investigated by the heads of the Internal Affairs Administration and the Procuracy in the manner prescribed by law."

There is good reason for the special interest in the exclusive bar. The owners serve a select clientele. One day they even turned away the deputy chief of the crime-fighting division, who had come there with his family, because he was not one of their regular patrons. Furthermore, this is not the first time the bar has been under investigation. How could an establishment with only around 10 patrons a night be so successful? High prices? Yes! But how high would they have to be to cover expenses and provide a profit? That is what made certain agencies suspicious....

The "Golden Bear" is closely associated with a firm in the motion picture business. Was it a coincidence that the deputy director of the firm was at the bar on the date of the "convention" and was one of the men detained by the special subdivision? Besides this, bar director Ye. Karpova



was a good friend of Mudryashov, the municipal administrator who was killed not long ago. He was not the only one who was killed at that time, during the struggle for spheres of influence and power. Now the people in charge are his friends and associates, and perhaps his conquerors, but it was Mudryashov who guaranteed the safety of the "Golden Bear."

"It was because of him that no one bothered us," Ye. Karpova admitted. "He told everyone that we were his friends. That was a long time ago, and no one has bothered us up to now...."

I think the proprietors of trade and food service establishments are well aware of the price of this protection. Literally all of them are expected to pay outrageous fees for it. Furthermore, it was apparently no coincidence that the interregional meeting of the "influential" men was held in the "Golden Bear." Incidentally, according to reports received by the organized crime-fighting division, the decision to give one of the Yaroslavl "authorities" the control of the purchase and sale of weapons was made at that "conference." One of the guests at the "family dinner" was killed in Moscow soon afterward. Another appeared on the central television network and announced his intention to form a new party. In this way, the consolidation of economic influence is being accompanied by the gradual politicizing of the crime world, reflecting its leaders' plans to use their capital to create more favorable conditions for their activities. The friendly gathering in the bar is already having far-reaching consequences.

Yaroslavl's proximity to Moscow has made it an appealing location for the investment of criminal capital in privatized state property, the sale of real estate, and involvement in trade and financial affairs. The money is usually invested in spheres with a quick turnover, where there are no production stages guaranteeing superprofits. The reason is simple: Businesses with a quick turnover of capital are difficult to monitor.

Is this why Yaroslavl is called the "sweet city"? The organized crime-fighting division assured me that they have the situation in the city under control and cited some reassuring statistics. Last year division personnel solved 227 crimes, 76 of which were committed by organized crime gangs, including 24 with implications of corruption. The criminals had managed to launder more than a billion rubles with the aid of fraudulent bank documents. A large criminal gang had been discovered in the oil business.

All of this is impressive, but reports received by the same division indicate the rapid growth and merger of criminal gangs in Yaroslavl. Private security firms with criminal connections are springing up like mushrooms. Trade establishments with respectable names are using coercive methods at privatization auctions to buy state property and real estate at low prices. The motor transport base with a large sports complex here, for example, was sold for only 60 million. According to a reliable source, a noodle shop with imported equipment was privatized for 47 million rubles.

Some commercial structures that were established as part of state enterprises are also closely related to criminal businesses. There are some companies with colossal assets in Yaroslavl that are still in the shadows. Some own hotels or gambling and trade establishments, but who is behind all of this? The common opinion is that criminal communities cannot exist without the help of corrupt officials, who cover their tracks in exchange for a share of their income.

The events at the "Golden Bear" aroused some interest and were then immediately forgotten. Only Kh. Alyautdinov took the failure to heart. Every cloud, however, has a silver lining. This might contribute to the realization that traditional police methods of fighting organized crime cannot produce the desired results. Running around in kitchens in bullet-proof vests and masks and waving assault rifles cannot be effective in fighting the forces that are now a visible segment of the Russian society. This will take other methods and other skills. We still have to learn them. From whom? From life, of course.

## Results of St Petersburg Elections

### Results of Elections to St Petersburg City Assembly

944F0558A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian 26 Mar 94 p 4

[Official deputy lists released by the city electoral commission: "Results of Elections to the St. Petersburg City Assembly on 20-21 March 1994"]

[Text]

[Abbreviations used: AO—joint-stock company; AOOT—publicly held joint-stock company; AOZT—privately held joint-stock company; TsNII—central scientific-research institute; VNII—all-Russia scientific-research institute; TSOO—limited liability partnership; PO—industrial association]

District No.	Name, surname	Year born	Place of employment, position	Years as St. Petersburg resident	Nominated by	Votes cast for candidate, in percent
2	Valeriy Aleksandrovich Golubev	1952	Vasileostrovskiy Rayon, head of administration	33	All Petersburg	24.77
	Oleg Borisovich Shulyakovskiy	1946	AOOT Baltiyskiy Zavod, director	22	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	14.15



District No.	Name, surname	Year born	Place of employment, position	Years as St. Petersburg resident	Nominated by	Votes cast for candidate, in percent
3	Aleksey Alekseyevich Liverovskiy	1947	St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University, associate professor	47	district voters, All Petersburg	31.74
	Igor Petrovich Ignatyev	1963	Federation Council Deputy, A.N. Belyayev's staff, aide	30	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	19.76
4	Leonid Petrovich Romankov	1937	Institute for Analytical Instrument-Building of the Russian Academy of Sciences, senior researcher	56	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	28.47
	Yuriy Dzhanovich Der-vyanko	1960	Astrobank, vice president	33	All Petersburg	11.29
8	Nikolay Mikhaylovich Arzhan-nikov	1955	International Human Rights company, expert	13	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	31.63
	Vladimir Mikhaylovich Golman	1934	AO Lenstroyzhil-servis, general director	50	district voters	22.11
9	Yuriy Mikhaylovich Novolod-skiy	1951	St. Petersburg Justice Department, chief	22	Safe Home Party; All Petersburg	25.20
	Yuriy Anatolyevich Kravtsov	1953	Convent law firm, director	22	The City We Love	16.71
10	Vitaliy Aleksan-drovich Lopota	1950	TsNII of Robotics and [word indistinct] Cybernetics, director and chief designer	22	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	22.99
	Mikhail Ivanovich Amosov	1959	St. Petersburg State University, lecturer	34	The City We Love	19.76
11	Valeriy Niko-layevich Selivanov	1939	St. Petersburg Nakhimov Navy School, instructor	54	The City We Love	27.46
	Natalya Ivanovna Pashina	1945	Marine Instru-ment-Building College, instructor	48	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	17.26
14	Sergey Nikolayevich Nikeshin	1958	XX Trest Corpo-ration, president	36	All Petersburg	24.75
	Yelena Aleksan-drovna Zhuk-ovskaya	1954	AO Garant, deputy chairman of the board of directors	39	district voters	17.20

District No.	Name, surname	Year born	Place of employment, position	Years as St. Petersburg resident	Nominated by	Votes cast for candidate, in percent
16	Sergey Yuryevich Andreyev	1954	Citizens coalition For Justice, chairman	40	Our City—Our Home	27.48
	Viktor Ivanovich Kharchenko	1935	Union of Associations of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg, president	39	Business Petersburg	18.49
17	Aleksandr Nikolayevich Belyayev	1953	Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, deputy	40	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	28.20
	Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shchekhanov	1939	Public Nonprofit Mission for Alternative Proposals, head	50	district voters	14.47
20	Nikolay Anisimovich Rochev	1935	Lesnoye state pedigree-breeding farm, director	19	district voters	12.59
	Ivan Ivanovich Kravchenko	1937	St. Petersburg branch of the State Tax Inspectorate, department chief	33	district voters	10.46
21	Lyudmila Borisovna Tiunova	1952	St. Petersburg State University, associate professor	41	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	19.34
	Mikhail Ivanovich Pirogov	1945	St. Petersburg University for Architecture and Building, lecturer	48	The City We Love	13.54
22	Lev Nikolayevich Karlin	1947	State Hydrometeorological Institute, rector	46	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	21.73
	Vadim Nikolayevich Zhimirov	1958	AO Almaz, general director	35	district voters	17.23
23	Boris Pavlovich Pustyntsev	1935	State Duma Deputy M.M. Molostvov's staff, aide	42	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	21.98
	Shukhrat Raufovich Sayfullayev	1947	AO Petr Velikiy, president	15	district voters	13.01
25	Andrey Vladimirovich Dombrovskiy	1960	Znaniye company Humanities Center, acting deputy director	33	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	16.13
	Boris Vasilyevich Gladkikh	1939	VNII Transmash, leading research associate	37	district voters	11.01

District No.	Name, surname	Year born	Place of employment, position	Years as St. Petersburg resident	Nominated by	Votes cast for candidate, in percent
26	Yuriy Pavlovich Gladkov	1949	Foundation for Financial Support of Small Business, president	44	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	23.54
	Vyacheslav Zakharovich Shestakov	1944	On call with the chief of St. Petersburg city administration of internal affairs	28	district voters	16.48
28	Viktor Leonidovich Surikov	1945	City of Kronstadt administration, head of administration	15	district voters	11.58
	Anatoliy Nikolayevich Krivenchenko	1952	Era public charity organization, chief legal counsel	41	district voters	11.27
31	Viktor Semenovich Novoselov	1947	Federal Migration Service of St. Petersburg, chief	47	district voters	38.99
	Vadim Nikolayevich Kosarev	1940	Northwestern representation of the Working Center for Economic Reforms, head	53	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	17.37
32	Vatanar Saidovich Yagya	1938	St. Petersburg State University, professor	55	district voters	28.36
	Viktor Fomich Bogachev	1938	Northwestern Agency for Entrepreneurship and Investment, president	41	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	10.46
33	Vladimir Grigoryevich Kolovay	1950	TSOO Lenvest, president	43	All Petersburg	24.79
	Andrey Vasilyevich Krylov	1957	Mining Institute, associate professor	36	district voters	21.61
39	Sergey Borisovich Tarasov	1959	AO UNIO, executive director	18	district voters	23.72
	Vyacheslav Sergeyevich Kalugin	1940	Union of St. Petersburg Citizens public association, chairman	47	Our City—Our Home	8.97
42	Ilya Mikhaylovich Baskin	1956	AO Garant, chairman of the board of directors	37	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	22.04
	Yevgeniy Petrovich Istomin	1953	Petrodvoretskiy Rayon administration, head of administration	6	district voters	16.62
43	Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Shcherbakov	1940	St. Petersburg vice mayor	17	The City We Love	38.47
	Olga Vladimirovna Kurnosova	1961	AOZT Lenkay, general director	32	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	17.88

District No.	Name, surname	Year born	Place of employment, position	Years as St. Petersburg resident	Nominated by	Votes cast for candidate, in percent
44	German Petrovich Gardymov	1941	PO Leningradskiy Severnyy Zavod, general director	45	district voters	31.14
	Irina Vladimirovna Lukashevich	1955	St. Petersburg State University, associate professor	38	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	13.40
48	Boris Sergeyevich Gubanov	1944	Baltiyskiy State Technical University, associate professor	49	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	27.47
	Leonid Nikolayevich Petrov	1943	State Disease Control Inspectorate, physician	30	Unity for Progress	11.74

Elections in the following districts were declared invalid: 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 27, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50.

### Results of Elections to Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly

944F0558B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 26 Mar 94 p 4

[Election results and list of deputies elected to the Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly]

[Text] The final results of the elections to the Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly are in.

As compared to the results of the two-day election marathon in St. Petersburg, the Leningrad Oblast elections may be considered a success. Voter turnout was 29.75 percent. Twenty-three deputies were elected. Only two deputy seats remain vacant: Elections were declared invalid in No. 11 Gatchinskiy and No. 23 Tikhvinskiy Districts.

The following have been elected deputies to the legislative assembly:

#### Boksitogorskiy District No. 1

Gennadiy Vasilyevich Belov, b. 1938, Russian, worker, Boksitogorskiy Glinozem joint-stock company.

#### Volosovskiye District No. 2

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Yegorov, b. 1948, director, Sumino state farm.

#### Volkhovskiy District No. 3

Sergey Vambolovich Ratasep, b. 1949, teacher, Volkhov College of Transportation Construction.

#### Volkhovskiy District No. 4

Grigoriy Grigoryevich Samsonenko, b. 1950, first deputy head, Volkhovskiy Rayon administration.

#### Morozovskiye District No. 5

Svetlana Nikolayevna Yurkova, b. 1954, mayor, city of Shlisselburg.

#### Vsevolozhskiy Electoral District No. 6

Aleksandr Pavlovich Vernikovskiy, b. 1954, administration chief, Federal Postal Service of Leningrad Oblast.

#### Sertolovskiye District No. 7

Nikolay Yuryevich Aborin, b. 1959, head of administration, Kuyvozov volost.

#### Vyborgskiy Electoral District No. 8

Georgiy Vasilyevich Smirnov, b. 1952, chief editor, Vyborg radio.

#### Vyborgskiy Electoral District No. 9

Gennadiy Ivanovich Kaluga, b. 1941, general director, Svetogorsk production association.

#### Rishchinskiy Electoral District No. 10

Yuriy Nikolayevich Fedotov, b. 1951, chief physician, Roshchino territorial medical association.

#### Gatchinskiy Electoral District No. 11

Elections declared invalid.

#### Siverskiy Electoral District No. 12

Sergey Borisovich Stepanov, b. 1948, general director, Belogorka northwestern scientific-industrial association for selection and plant-breeding.

#### Kommunarovskiye District No. 13

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Semenov, b. 1941, director, Vyritsa experimental-mechanical plant.

#### Kingiseppskiy Electoral District No. 14

Artur Ivanovich Pozov, b. 1955, deputy chairman of the board, Northern Trade Bank.

#### Kirishskiy Electoral District No. 15

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Yermolayev, b. 1958, director, Kirishi representation of Yurals Russo-Dutch joint venture.

#### Kirovskiy Electoral District No. 16



Yuriy Aleksandrovich Alferov, b. 1938, director, state regional power station No. 8 of the Imeni Kirova Leningrad Joint-Stock company.

*Lomonosovskiy Electoral District No. 17*

Igor Nikolayevich Yudchenko, b. 1956, chief physician, Lomonosovskiy Rayon territorial medical association.

*Luzhskiy Electoral District No. 18*

Viktor Anufriyevich Sanets, b. 1952, director, Imeni Dzerzhinskogo State Farm in Luzhskiy Rayon.

*Podporozhskiy Electoral District No. 19*

Vladimir Konstantinovich Nikolayev, b. 1957, chief, port of Podporozhye.

*Priozerskiy Electoral District No. 20*

Vitaliy Maksimovich Stepanko, b. 1941, general director, Granit-Kuznechnoye joint-stock company.

*Slantsevskiy Electoral District No. 21*

Vasiliy Vasilyevich Ivanov, b. 1950, editor, rayon newspaper ZNAMYA TRUDA.

*Sosnovoborskiy Electoral District No. 22*

Valeriy Ivanovich Nekrasov, b. 1945, mayor, city of Sosnovy Bor.

*Tikhvinskiy Electoral District No. 23*

Elections declared invalid

*Tosnenskiy Electoral District No. 24*

Valeriy Vasilyevich Sazonov, b. 1946, director, Vostochnyy state enterprise.

*Nikolskiy Electoral District No. 25*

Anatoliy Pavlovich Gorbachev, b. 1929, director, Zavod Sokol state enterprise.

*As is known, in the evening of 18 March the oblast government decree on holding a referendum on 20 March on the draft charter of Leningrad Oblast was suspended by the presidential edict.*

*The draft was nevertheless presented to the voters. In the form of a poll, however, which is not legally binding. Those who answered the poll questions comprised 29.5 percent of the electorate. Of them, 53.73 percent supported the draft, and 38.36 percent were against. It is now up to the Legislative Assembly to adopt the charter; the assembly's first session is scheduled for 19 April.*

**St Petersburg Election Analyzed**

944F0547A St. Petersburg SANKT  
PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian  
6 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Ye. Dolgopyatova: "Women and Workers Were Not Elected"]

[Text] Yesterday the city electoral commission held a news conference in Mariynskiy Palace and made public the

preliminary results of the second round of elections to the St. Petersburg City Assembly.

Only 18.76 percent of the overall number of registered voters participated in the voting. Elections were held in 24 electoral precincts. The social composition of the deputies is curious: eight were managers, five—teachers, four—businessmen, three—scientific associates, three—representatives of public organizations, and one—an office employee. Not a single worker was among the candidates who were elected. Among the deputies there is not a single representative of the fair sex—all five women who entered the second round suffered defeat by their male competitors.

The deputy chairman of the city electoral commission, R.G. Malova, noted that the situation was calmer in the second round of the elections. There were no serious complaints or grievances. In Rita Grigoryevna's opinion, the voters made their choice, which was significantly different from the results of the first round, on the basis of television and radio debates, which helped the Petersburgers to get to know the candidates directly.

According to observations of the state electoral commission, it was mostly the older generation who voted and there were practically no youth at the precincts except a certain number of students and military servicemen.

A very strange situation developed in the 39th electoral district of Oktyabrskiy Rayon. As we know, the state electoral commission kept an eye out for violations when the results of the first round of voting were being summed up. According to information from the chairman of the city electoral commission, V.I. Fomichev, only 20,030 people voted here during 20-21 March, while there are 80,875 voters registered in Oktyabrskiy Rayon. Thus the necessary 25 percent did not participate in the first round of voting. On these grounds the city electoral commission declared the first round of elections in the 39th district to be null and void. But the city's mayor, A.A. Sobchak, subsequently overrode the decision of the city commission, and on 3 April there was a repeat vote in this district as well. But the city electoral commission did not intend to take these results into account.

V.I. Fomichev thinks that the city acted in keeping with the Statute on Elections to the City Assembly within the limits of its authority and that no official has the right to override its decision. This can be done only through the courts.

Thus another has been added to the many points of confusion regarding the past elections.

**St Petersburg Election Protested**

944F0547B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Viktoriya Rabotnova: "Shall We Begin at the Beginning?"]

[Text] The Council of Electoral Associations has confirmed its statement of 21 March, which discusses the illegality of the spring elections to the City Assembly. The

council continues to insist on conducting in 1994 truly democratic elections to the deputy corps, combining the voting with a poll of the population concerning confidence in the mayor of St. Petersburg.

It is worth noting that the petition was signed not only by those who lost but also by the "City We Love" movement, whose candidates won in five districts, and also the "Our City—Our Home" and "Unity for Progress" movements, which also achieved a certain amount of success. As we know, Aleksandr Shelkanov has not changed his opinion about the illegality of the elections. But the representatives of "Democratic Unity," "Business St. Petersburg," and "All St. Petersburg" still hold the opposite viewpoint.

Incidentally, the leaders of "Democratic Unity" are now in Moscow—the question of the elections in our city is expected to be discussed at today's session of the State Duma.

#### **Sobchak Founds Development Bank**

944F0578A St. Petersburg SANKT  
PETERSBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian  
14 Apr 94 p 1

[Report by SANKT PETERSBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI INFORMATION AGENCY: "St. Petersburg Bank for Reconstruction and Development Is Created"]

[Text] The St. Petersburg Bank for Reconstruction and Development (SPBRD) held its founding meeting yesterday in Smolnyy. The new bank, in the form of a publicly-held joint-stock society, was founded by the Committee for the Administration of City Property (CACP), the Population Employment Fund, the largest insurance funds, and state enterprises.

The decision to create the SPBRD was made by the city mayorality, with the support of the Central Bank of Russia Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko. The bank is to become the city administration's agent in working with large investments, as a partner of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The meeting appointed a bank supervisors' council headed by Anatoliy Sobchak; among its members are deputy mayors Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Yakovlev, Mikhail Manevich, and Vitaliy Mutko. Deputy chairman of the St. Petersburg government, Aleksey Kudrin, was elected chairman of the board of directors, and Dmitriy Pankin, his deputy in the economics and finance committee, the chairman of the board of trustees.

The bank's charter capital is set at 6,923,050,000 rubles. The city, represented by CACP, will own 35 percent of the stock. The SPBRD's headquarters will be located at 78 Moyka Embankment, and its branches and administrations, at 14 Izmaylovo Avenue and 8 Moscow Avenue.

#### **St Petersburg, Poll on Mayor**

944F0578B St. Petersburg SANKT  
PETERSBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian  
14 Apr 94 p 5

[Article by S. Grachev, editor of the social policy and letters department: "Sociologists Maintain That Our Main Concern Is Crime"]

[Text] Today, with the help of the Ecro Company, we will tell what St. Petersburg residents think of the work of the bodies of executive authority—the Russian Government and the St. Petersburg mayorality. The figures (all are given as percents) tell us that we are becoming increasingly critical of the institutes of authority in general and executive authority in particular. In this respect, it would be instructive to compare the results of previous sociological surveys published in SANKT PETERSBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI with the results tabulated by the Ecro Company. Well, while in February 1993 only 38 percent of city residents did not believe that the authorities would be able to pull the country out of the crisis, in August 1993 this figure had already increased to 43 percent. Today, however, to the question "Do you believe that the existing executive authority in Russia is capable of pulling the country out of the crisis?" only 17 percent answered affirmatively, while 63 percent answered unequivocally negatively.

Our compatriots are somewhat more charitable of the mayorality actions. "Negative" was the reply of 35 percent and "somewhat negative"—of 19 percent. There are, however, also fewer unequivocally positive replies—6 percent.

What does it all tell us? First and foremost, that the negative trends that manifest themselves sharply around the country, most often are contained in our city, thereby ensuring a relative social stability.

At the same time, another research recently commissioned by the newspaper points at those spheres of the city life which increasingly often cause our dissatisfaction today and by which the people judge the mayorality's work. The wording of the question was: "What are the problems the city authorities should pay the greatest attention to?" The response shows that the problem of combating crime by far leads the list—78 percent. The second is social security—43.5 percent, and the third, health care—43.3 percent; they are followed by transportation problems—31.7 percent, unemployment—26.5 percent, availability of housing—26 percent, supply of goods—25.3 percent, and education—18.4 percent. (Each respondent could select no more than three problems that are most important for him. Therefore the total exceeds 100 percent.)

It is quite obvious that confidence in local authorities is determined to a great extent by how well it takes into account concerns and wishes of ordinary city residents. And they name first, let us repeat, suppression of crime and personal safety, social security, and operation of health care facilities and transportation.

### What Is Your Appraisal of the Mayoralty's Work? (in percent)

Positive	6
Somewhat positive	9
Somewhat negative	19
Negative	35
No opinion	31

### Moscow's Environmental Protection Body Surveys City

944F0553A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 25 Mar 94 p 7

["Selective rendition" of Moscow Committee on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources report, by Ye. Subbotina: "Moskompriroda Is Watching Attentively"]

[Text] Moskompriroda [Moscow Committee on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources] specialists have prepared a review of the environmental protection activities of enterprises and other facilities. The review was compiled from the results of state oversight activities in 1993. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA found it expedient to publish a selective rendition of this work. Of course, many facts registered by Moskompriroda are alarming and a cause for health concerns. All of us would rather see a smog-free capital city; the reality today, however, is that Moscow is an industrial giant saturated to capacity with industrial and automotive transportation enterprises, warehouse zones, and transportation arteries. There are 62 large industrial zones on city territory inside the beltway. Automobiles are the main contributors to environmental pollution. The number of cars in Moscow is growing annually; 200,000 cars were added in 1993. As of 1 January last year there were more than 1 million cars in the city. The increasing number of cars is a direct route to increased discharge of harmful substances into the atmosphere.

The finding of Moskompriroda specialists is that environmental pollution in Moscow remains high.

### What We Breathe

In 1993 the Moscow State Inspection for Protection of the Atmosphere conducted 1,120 checks at industrial and automotive transportation enterprises in the city. It uncovered 10,166 violations. Industry and power generation discharged 230,718 tonnes of pollutants. Of this discharge, 90 percent comprise solid substances and nitrogen, carbons, and hydrocarbon oxides. Analysis of the state of atmospheric air shows that the higher than average level of pollution is created by discharges of nitrogen, ammonia, benzene, phenol, and hydrocarbon dioxides.

Motor vehicles are serious air polluters. Moskompriroda conducted inspections of automotive transportation enterprises; twice—in May and September—it conducted Operation Clean Air. It inspected 520 enterprises, including the AMO ZIL [Imeni Lenina Auto Works] and AZLK plant [Imeni Leninskogo Komsomola Auto Works]. It registered

856 violations. Thousands of cars were checked by instruments, and one out of five did not meet standards.

More than 71,000 cars were checked for exhaust toxicity in the course of Operation Clean Air. The number of cars that did not meet state standards amounted to 14.7 percent. This is unquestionably a large number, although we can console ourselves with the fact that in 1992 the same indicator measured 17.7 percent. To a large extent the reduction has been achieved as a result of automotive enterprises beginning to actively equip themselves with gas analysis apparatus.

The total discharge of pollutants into the atmosphere in 1993 (industry and automotive transport) amounted to more than 1 million tonnes.

A special issue are foundries within city limits. On 1 February 1990, a decision was adopted on 56 priority steps aimed at reducing the discharge of hazardous substances from foundries at the city's 53 enterprises. As of 1 January of this year, 53 points of the program have been implemented; it includes reconstruction and liquidation of foundries, construction of gas scrubbers, and reduction of the production volume by reducing deliveries to other regions. Two points have not been implemented: the metal household goods plant No. 6 has not been shut down (Southwestern district) and the foundry of the Stekloagregat plant (Southern district) has not undergone reconstruction. By now foundry discharges into the atmosphere have been cut by 9,924 tonnes, which is 83 percent of that envisaged in the full program.

### The Water We Drink

In 1993 the Moscow City Inspection for the Protection of Water Resources conducted 1,029 checks at 947 facilities. Among them are 456 industrial and automotive transportation enterprises, Mosvodokanal, and Mosvodostok.

It was established that the city's aeration stations, which dump insufficiently purified waste into the Moscow River, and dumping from construction sites and residential areas remain the main sources of pollution of Moscow reservoirs. Moskompriroda inspectors uncovered 396 violations of water protection legislation. The violators were fined a total of 18,935 million rubles [R].

The inspectors found that of 252 operating industrial waste purification systems, almost half (!) were ineffective or out of order. In 1992, 60 percent of systems were noted as out of order. Overall, the situation remains unsatisfactory.

It is good to see that 84 of the total number of inspected enterprises have 149 circulating water cycle system functioning, and 19 enterprises have 24 systems using recycled water.

Among the violators of water protection legislation were the NPO [scientific-industrial association] Kauchuk, the First Watch Factory, the AP [joint-stock enterprise] Meridian, the oil and lubricant plant, the Dynamo plant, the Danilovo cab manufacturing plant, and others.



Overall there has been a reduction in the discharge of metals, petroleum products, and suspended particles, which is a result of cutbacks in production as well as of water-purification systems being installed at industrial facilities.

Analysis of aeration stations' operations for past year leads to the following conclusions: The Kuryanov, Lyubertsy, and Zelenograd stations and the Lyublino shop for comprehensive water purification dump liquid waste that does not meet standard requirements, which pollutes rivers. The reasons for unsatisfactory operations of the stations is delay in bringing on line reserve capacities and overload of currently operating capacities.

A serious strain on the environment comes from Galvanic production, which essentially dumps heavy metal salts. The Government of Moscow's program, which envisages liquidation and reconstruction of galvanic production, is being implemented too slowly.

More dirt is brought by snow, which is dumped into the Moscow River—snow carries into the water petroleum products, chlorides, and suspended particles.

The city's main river is still not in good health. The segments of the Moscow River within the city limits that are in the worst shape are still the sites where waste water is being dumped from city aeration stations. In 1993, 11 tributaries of the Moscow River were checked. The negative effect of 10 of them is negligible; only Yauza has a perceptible role in pollution of the Moscow River.

The most polluted rivers are Yauza, Filka, Presnya, and Kotlovka, where specific pollution is detected: petroleum products—from 3 to 94 (!) MAL [maximum allowable level]; and heavy metal salts, especially copper, iron, and zinc—up to 37 MAL.

#### The Soil We Walk On

As of 1 January 1994 there were 102 unauthorized dump sites in Moscow with a total area of 280 hectares and consisting mostly of solid household and industrial waste and construction trash. The largest dump sites are located at Verkhniye Polya Street (30 hectares), Brateyevo (15 hectares), and Anreyevskiy Ravine (10 hectares). Over the past year 17 dump sites with a total area of 17 hectares have been removed.

Moskompriroda has registered a multitude of violations with respect to land use: unauthorized seizure of land; unauthorized construction; failure to fulfill obligations to conduct an environmental impact study; violations of environmental requirements in storing industrial and household waste.

The legality of construction of 63 parking lots and garages was checked. The greatest number of violations were registered in the Southwestern (12), Southern (9), and Northeastern (5) districts. The action with respect to violations included 60 removal orders, 25 decrees on suspension of work, and 101 protocols on initiation of administrative court proceedings in an amount of R18 million.

Over the past year measures of economic coercion in an amount of R134 million were taken against violators of environmental protection legislation. Damage compensation fines amounted to R120 million.

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### Business Papers Assess U.S. Delegation's Visit

#### Tariffs, Pending U.S. Deals Focus of Trip

944Q0295A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 30 Mar 94 pp 1,4

[Article by Viktor Zamyatin: "Visit of U.S. Secretary of Commerce: Ministers Do Not Come to Russia Now Without Businessmen"]

[Text] It is not known which there is more of—politicians or businessmen—in the delegation of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown (he is cochairman of the Russian-American Committee for Business Cooperation) that began its visit to Moscow yesterday. The managers of 28 very big U.S. companies arrived together with him.

On the list of Brown's audiences were several ministries (the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of Fuel and Energy, Ministry of Economics, and Ministry of Finance), Yuriy Petrov, the head of the Russian Investment Company, and the prime minister himself, Viktor Chernomyrdin. Along with the general situation in Russia, specific questions were also discussed—the participation of American firms in projects to develop the Sakhalin shelf, investments in Russia, and access for its commodities to U.S. markets. The secretary of commerce used the occasion to express concern over the increase in import tariffs in Russia. He reported that he does not share the opinion that is current here, particularly in the Ministry of Economics, that protectionism will attract investments (the argument of the Ministry of Economics is that in order to overcome the barrier to imports, foreigners will create production in Russia).

Brown's mission, obviously, is to dot the "i's" with respect to other problems—the fate of the most expensive IBM project in Russia (at a cost of \$130 million), which is being financed by the EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development] (\$40 million), and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (\$90 million). There is the question of replacing the long obsolete Sirena-2 computer system used in the sale of air tickets. Not long ago a competitor appeared for the IBM project: The Department of Air Transport of Russia has proposed phased modernization of Sirena-2 for a total of \$40 million. However, this plan, other than its relative cheapness, is also different in that it is based on a sharp reduction in the volume of air traffic and threatens to turn into "patching up holes" (if it has a temporary character). Brown will try to convince Moscow that the popular idea of "supporting domestic producers" is not always justified from the standpoint of long-range interests.

The secretary of commerce regards discussion of various forms of assistance to the development of small and

medium-sized business in Russia as one of the leading themes of his negotiations in Moscow. As Ron Brown likes to say, the strength and power of the United States have always increased precisely owing to the "increase and expansion of small and medium-sized firms." Obviously, it is exactly in this connection that he planned a visit not only to the Russian capital: Questions of increasing the effectiveness of American assistance programs to the private sector will be a subject of discussion in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg. In addition, in the opinion of the secretary expressed in an interview just before departing for Moscow, the aid given should be oriented on intensifying the export potential of the private sector. But, in the opinion of the U.S. secretary of commerce, it is also called on to be the main object for American export to Russia. Washington is pursuing quite reasonable economic interests: An increase in the volume of exports of \$1 billion will lead to an increase in the number of jobs in the United States by 20,000.

Moreover, the American administration does not conceal the fact that it is still early to view trade and business with Russia separately from politics. For, as he figuratively expressed it at yesterday's negotiations, "stability and predictability are the sisters of investment."

#### **Russian Businessmen Excluded**

944Q0295B Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
31 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Larisa Ilyina, DELOVOY MIR correspondent: "A Business Meeting, but Without Russian Businessmen"]

[Text] The interest of American capital in the Russian market can be felt just as clearly as, let us say, the thrust of a tidal wave on the parapet of a quay. Half of the presidential mission of U.S. business circles headed by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown that is now in Russia is made up of the managers of leading American companies, among which are such giants as Occidental Petroleum, Rockwell International, AT&T, and others. And, apparently, it is not accidental that almost all the questions raised by the guests during a roundtable meeting with Russian ministers were concentrated on one problem: guarantees for foreign investments in Russia.

In responding to these questions, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin reported that the parliamentary committee on economic policy was now developing a new variant of a law on foreign investments. He expressed the firm conviction that a bilateral Russian-American agreement on protection of investments will be ratified.

The range of questions discussed at a meeting Wednesday of the interdepartmental committee on the development of economic cooperation was very wide: power engineering, trade, investments, U.S. technical and financial assistance provided along the line of the Agency for International Development, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and programs in the sphere of agriculture. Objects of special attention were such critical problems as Russian tariff and nontariff trade barriers, delays with

payments, etc. A special working group was established that will examine questions of access to each other's markets.

A memorandum of mutual agreement of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States was signed on the establishment of American business centers in Russia, [a memorandum on] the scope of the jurisdiction of the intergovernmental committee on the development of business cooperation, and also joint statements of the cochairmen of the Russian-American Committee—O. Davydov and Ron Brown—on the question of access to Russian and U.S. markets and improving conditions of cooperation in the sphere of the medical industry.

The American secretary, well-known as "a builder of bridges" between our two countries, noted more than once that one of the purposes of the visit of such a representative delegation (it is made up of more than 100 persons) is "to listen to the voice of private entrepreneurs and to give American and Russian businesses an opportunity to start direct contacts." However, our observer did not find one representative of domestic private and joint-stock business at even one of the meetings. Even in the council on the development of entrepreneurship under the Government of the Russian Federation they replied to a question on contacts with the American delegation that they...are hearing this for the first time. Well, perhaps they will make up for the omission—if not in Moscow then in Yekaterinburg or St. Petersburg, where the American presidential delegation was continuing its trip.

#### **U.S. Business Leaders See 1994 as Pivotal**

944Q0295C Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 31 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Svetlana Sukhova: "Visit of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce: There Are Four Disasters in Russia: Roads, Fools, Taxes, and Tariffs"]

[Text] Yesterday Boris Yeltsin received U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, who has come to Russia for a week. The president's press service, as always, was niggardly with its words: Yeltsin, they said, expressed interest in "an expansion of mutually beneficial ties in all spheres of trade." In addition, he assured his interlocutor that the American mass media are incorrect in discussing a certain cooling in Russian-U.S. relations. Although the situation is still far from salutary.

After Brown's arrival in Moscow, the parties, exchanging white-toothed smiles, switched to claims. To the number of major Russian disasters, besides the roads and fools noted by Gogol, two more, in the opinion of the Americans, should be added: Russian taxes and import tariffs. As KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondents learned from sources in the U.S. delegation of businessmen accompanying Brown, many of them consider 1994 to be a pivotal year: Either there will be a turning point in Russian tax and tariff legislation or they will curtail their activity here. But if the problems are resolved, U.S. experts predict a level of American investments in 1995 on the order of \$10 billion.

Ron Brown also joined the Russian chorus of opponents of protectionism. Yeltsin also expressed himself in this regard the other day, and Chernomyrdin declared that a number of tariffs will be revised. It will really be necessary to hurry with this: At the "Group of 7" summit in Naples in the summer, Russia intends to raise the question of opening the markets of the West to its products, and here reciprocity is necessary. The first step has been taken in this direction in relations with the United States: A statement on mutual access to markets was signed yesterday at a meeting of the committee on business cooperation. If the memorandum on establishing business centers in Russia (talk about them has been going on a long time) and the statement on cooperation in the sphere of medicine are not taken into account, Brown's visit was not abundant in documents.

Of the major practical achievements, mention should be made of continuation of work in expert groups on plans for the development of the Sakhalin shelf (Sakhalin-1) and the joint exploitation with TEXACO of the Timano-Pechora (Komi) oil and gas region: Work will begin in the summer. Today, Brown is departing for St. Petersburg. On 5 April, KOMMERSANT-DAILY will return to the elucidation of his visit.

**Commerce Secretary Brown's Moscow Visit Assessed**

94P50121A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 14, 3-10 Apr 94 p C10

[Unattributed article: "Brown Persuades His Countrymen on the Urals and Siberia. American Business Continues To Explore the Russian Market"]

[Text] "We want to begin a new era of cooperation between the United States and Russia based on growing possibilities for trade and investment," as U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown defined the goal of his visit to Moscow. And although it is still early to speak about the approach of a new era, Brown's mission can mobilize business connections of the two countries which are lagging much behind the level of their political dialogue.

The American delegation included representatives from such world-renowned companies and corporations as Motorola, Occidental Petroleum, Litton Industries, Oil Capital Limited, Macdermott International and Allen And Associations International. In the opinion of the Clinton administration, the flow of investments into the fuel-energy complex, space science, the creation of telecommunications systems and the production of medicines will allow the Russian to see more graphically the fruits of reform and to accelerate their implementation.

One of the tasks of Brown's trip, which is being called the economic continuation of Bill Clinton's and Boris Yeltsin's Moscow meeting, is to urge American investors to enter Russia more boldly. The level of American investments in Russia today comprises one billion dollars (\$1 out of a total volume of American investments of \$490 billion.

By comparison, Americans invested \$239 billion in Europe, \$68 billion in Canada, \$26 billion in Japan and \$13 billion in Mexico.

Testing the soil for possible investments in Russia, Brown's team visited the Urals, the region where 80 percent of the largest defense industries are concentrated. Of these already 250 have undergone conversion. The great possibilities of the Ural region and its well-known independent economic policy attracted the Americans. It is no accident that in recent years more and more foreign investments are pouring into the region and that Western businesses are more often looking at it, justly evaluating it as a prospective trade partner.

During the course of Brown's visit a number of agreements were signed, one of which provides for opening American business centers in a number of Russian cities, mainly in the Urals and Siberia. These centers will not only help American firms arrange business matters in a specific region, but will also aid in the development of Russian firms which wish to cooperate with American colleagues.

In addition, along with Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin, the head of the U.S. Department of Commerce signed a statement which views the main task as opening up access to the markets of both countries.

While ongoing plans for Russian-American economic cooperation were being further worked out in Moscow, the end of COCOM was officially registered in The Hague. However, as U.S. State Department representative Michael [McCarey] stated, until a new system of export control is created Washington will continue to maintain a strict licensing policy regarding trade in goods based on high technology. Therefore it is no accident that in the bilateral trade relations between Russia and America the emphasis is on consumer goods. However, the list of prospective products delivered to Russian from the U.S., which was drawn up by the American side, includes machinery and equipment for the oil and gas industry, fertilizers, equipment for the food industry, medicines and medical preparations, medical equipment, computers and many other items.

At the same time, the Russian market will not see American high-tech products except for telecommunications. Therefore Brown's mission has special significance. It would like to prove that this is the first swallow [bird] of large-scale Russian-American economic cooperation and not a smoke screen intended to hide existing problems and contradictions in bilateral cooperation.

*The 52-year old Ronald Brown is a lawyer by education and has the reputation of being "a strong and independent advocate of American business interests". He arrived in Moscow with his "team" of 29 large industrialists representing four sectors: oil and gas, aeronautics, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.*



**UN Deputy Secretary General Petrovskiy on Accomplishments, Goals***944Q0282A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian No 12, 25-31 Mar 94 p 9*

[Interview with Vladimir Petrovskiy, first deputy UN secretary general, by Irina Denisova: "I Devote My Free Time to Work"]

[Text] As is often the case with our compatriots working abroad, more is more often known and written about them "over there" than at home. Vladimir Petrovskiy is no exception. The rank of first deputy UN secretary general and leader of this organization's European headquarters has secured for him extensive celebrity in the diplomatic world. In Russia, on the other hand, Vladimir Fedorovich is "known by sight" only by his foreign policy department colleagues, in the main. OBSHCAYA GAZETA's interview with Vladimir Petrovskiy is an attempt to right this injustice.

[Denisova] Vladimir Fedorovich, practical diplomacy is not your only and not even your first love. Many people know you from your books.

[Petrovskiy] Truly, I was right from the outset attracted not only and not so much to practical diplomatic work. "The History of Diplomacy," which, I recall, I read without putting it down almost, was published just after the war. An unknown world of negotiations, political battles, and striking personalities opened up before me—a young boy from Novosibirsk. Enrolling in the International Relations Institute, I knew full well even then that I would after graduation go into graduate work and would write my dissertation on the history of diplomacy. My work for my degree, which was devoted to the British diplomatic service, gained high marks, and I was recommended for graduate work without having to sit examinations. But this was the time of Khrushchev's reforms: To embark on graduate work at that time it was necessary to have spent two or three years in practical work. Thus I came to be in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957. And I defended my dissertations both for my candidate's degree and doctorate while working in the Foreign Ministry. Working on my books, I studied the mechanisms of diplomacy and foreign policy and then switched to a study of the theory of international relations and the foreign policy thought of the United States. I subsequently wrote on such problems as disarmament, the European process, and international organizations. My latest book, which appeared in 1985, "Security in the Nuclear and Space Age," was devoted to the shaping of the new political thinking.

Words to the effect that there is nothing of substance in the "new political thinking concept" and that distinctions may be drawn only between correct and incorrect ways of thinking are to be heard at this time, incidentally. I cannot agree. Mankind is currently negotiating a change of one civilization paradigm for another, as was the case at the time of the transition from the ancient world to the Middle Ages and from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. Thanks to scientific and technological progress, people feel

themselves to be more than ever the inhabitants of one planet, the occupants of a common home. The new thinking is planetary thinking, when patriotism becomes inseparable from internationalism. And as far as the division of thinking into correct and incorrect is concerned, this is a model of the old way of thinking: Whoever thinks "not with us," thinks "against us."

[Denisova] In February 1992 you left the position of first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia and became deputy UN secretary general for policy, and in March 1993 you came simultaneously to head the United Nations' European Department. A year of work in New York and a year in Geneva—what has been achieved?

[Petrovskiy] I arrived at the United Nations in a period when, thanks to the end of the cold war, there had been a change not only in the international political environment but in the United Nations itself. The place of this organization in the changing world had to be conceptualized anew. So it was that the UN secretary general instructed me to take charge of work on preparation of his report "Agenda for Peace." This was a unique experiment in collective search for answers to the question of the role of the United Nations under the new conditions. The working group studied an enormous number of proposals concerning the renewal of the United Nations coming from both states and academic and other nongovernment institutions. I should mention with satisfaction that Russian political thought made a significant contribution, particularly to the elaboration of the concept of preventive and peacemaking diplomacy.

Aside from this, there was much practical work also. I was entrusted with negotiating a settlement of the Libyan crisis, took part in the elaboration of the concept and rules of procedure of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, was in charge of the reorganization of the political machinery of the central headquarters of the United Nations, and was present at the birth of the first actions of preventive diplomacy.

After New York, I found myself in Geneva—the second center of activity of the United Nations, where the threads of the control of UN operations not only connected with the safeguarding of peace but also with socioeconomic development, a strengthening of democratic institutions, and the establishment of international standards in the sphere of science and technology are concentrated. Geneva has afforded enormous opportunities for the realization of the ideas which were contained in the report "Agenda for Peace."

A most important task is to use the unique multilateral negotiating mechanism available in Geneva—the Conference on Disarmament, whose secretariat I came to head last December—for the speediest preparation of an all-embracing treaty banning tests of nuclear weapons and to contribute to a settlement of conflicts and crises.

Another task is to provide for the interaction of the United Nations and European regional structures—the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Conference

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. For the United Nations this is exceptionally important in a practical sense because in a period of global change numerous problems can be resolved only in close interaction with regional mechanisms. And the European regional structures, which have built up great political capital, could be both a help to the United Nations and a kind of good example for other regimes.

I believe that today, when a strengthening of the existing mechanisms and the formation of new mechanisms of regional interaction are required, it is Europe that could help in both word and deed. And for the development of regional cooperation in the geopolitical space of the former Union the experience of West Europe would be very useful.

[Denisova] What, briefly, is the essence of the reform of the United Nations and its European Department?

[Petrovskiy] We have outlined a reform of the UN European Department, the purpose of which is to make Geneva a second global center of the United Nations.

The plan of action provides, first, for a decentralization of management and the endowment of the European headquarters with greater freedom in organizational decision-making and, second, for the most efficient use possible of the unique multilateral mechanisms available in Geneva and the elimination of duplication in their work. Geneva will be the headquarters of the UN high commissioner for human rights, who has just been appointed.

I believe that at least one or two sessions of the Security Council could perfectly well be held here annually at foreign minister level.

It is important to observe that the activity of the European headquarters of the United Nations could be of great interest to Russia also. First, the path leading to Russia's integration in the system of the world economy lies via Geneva. Russia's membership of the GATT is of priority significance in this connection. This would not only complete Russia's representation in all the most important world economic structures but would also afford equal opportunities for an outlet onto the world market. Second, unique experience of learning in all spheres has been accumulated here. Today, when Russia is engaged in the formation of the legislative foundations of the new democracy and new economic structures, there is no need, I believe, to be reinventing the wheel, it is perfectly possible to make use of the recommendations of international organizations, with, of course, an adjustment for the "road conditions" of each specific country.

[Denisova] What do you like to do in your free time, do you have a hobby?

[Petrovskiy] My life has been such that for me work is both service and, in a sense, a hobby because diplomacy was and is for me a subject of both practical and academic interest. This is quite convenient since I do not have any free time in any case. I value contacts with my diplomat colleagues, with friends. I am, as before, interested in art.

We are currently preparing for the 50th anniversary of the United Nations and we would like to open the Palace of Nations, where the European Department of the United Nations is located, to the public. This is an architectural monument, a striking work of art deco. We would like also to show the public the archives of the League of Nations. These archives are rich not only politically but also artistically. We have in our storerooms works of Maurice Denis, Vlaminck, Kate Kuhlitz, and other outstanding artists of the first half of the 20th century. The collection of geographical maps is an inestimable treasure of the Palace of Nations. Maps are, after all, not only a plan of terrain but also a graphic expression of political consciousness.

[Denisova] The visit to Russia of the UN secretary general is scheduled for 1 April. What do you expect from this visit?

[Petrovskiy] Primarily a meaningful dialogue between the UN secretary general and the president of Russia. Questions connected with a settlement of the crisis situations will be at the center of attention. The United Nations is today contributing actively to the settlement of conflicts in the geopolitical space of the former Union—in Georgia and Tajikistan. For its part, Russia is actively helping in the search for diplomatic solutions in the Near East and taking part in UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. But this is just one aspect of the visit. Questions of the use of the United Nations' socioeconomic possibilities for the accomplishment of the tasks that confront Russia will be discussed also.

#### **Duma Subcommittee Chairman Airs Doubts About P4P**

944Q0301A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 14, 3-10 Apr 94 p A12

[Article by Vyacheslav Nikonov, doctor of historical sciences and chairman of the RF [Russian Federation] State Duma Subcommittee on International Security and Arms Control: "Partnership in the Name of NATO?"]

[Text] In the course of the recent heated discussion which took place at the plenary meeting of the State Duma regarding the prospects of Russia's joining in the "Partnership in the Name of Peace," one of the deputies called this program a "Partnership in the Name of NATO." Judging by the audience reaction, the misquote was to the liking of many, reflecting the Duma's cautious attitude toward this program.

The matter here is far from being one of conservatism or anti-Western sentiment of a significant portion of the deputy corps. It is difficult to expect a different reaction when the parliamentarians learn of Russia's joining in the "Partnership" as being an accomplished fact by reading about it in the newspapers. However, I will try to express in brief their doubts and questions.

1. Is the West not trying to use the "Partnership" to help fill the vacuum formed in Eastern Europe after the USSR, and later Russia, rejected the "Brezhnev doctrine," agreed with the unification of Germany and withdrew its troops

from this region? After all, the non-expansion of NATO was one of the conditions for many of these unilateral steps.

2. It is understandable why NATO needs the "Partnership," but it is not quite understandable why it is needed by Russia. There are no real external threats from which it would be protected by participation in the program. Or is it necessary for defense against the territorial aspirations of certain Baltic states?

3. For the countries of Eastern Europe, the "Partnership" is a step along the path to NATO, a sort of understudy membership in the North Atlantic block. Under such conditions, can we speak of Russia's participation in the program on an equal basis, since it turns out to be in the NATO dressing room together with Romania and Lithuania? And why act as the understudy, when Russia has the power to play for primary membership, to which it will hardly be accepted in the near future.

4. NATO was created and acted primarily as a means of containing communism. The world has changed. Would it not be better today to use the mechanism of the CSCE [Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe] to ensure European security, supplementing it with cooperation in the military sphere, and also to present prospective guarantees of security to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the part of Russia and the West?

5. Will the "Partnership in the Name of Peace" not inflict a serious decline upon the military-political integration within the framework of the CIS? The Commonwealth countries will participate in the program in an individual order, and this may not always correspond with their obligations within the CIS.

6. What are the possible domestic political consequences of the "Partnership" for Russia, and primarily for the export capacities of our VPK [military-industrial complex]? After all, the countries of Eastern Europe will still gravitate more toward the Western arms markets. Moreover, the "Partnership" is not free. Each country pays for participation in it from its own budget. The deputies have not yet seen an estimate of the cost of Russian participation.

7. Have the domestic political consequences of joining in the "Partnership" been evaluated? We cannot exclude the possibility that the unfavorable attitude toward NATO retained in the consciousness of many people will evoke an upsurge of nationalist rhetoric, which will play into the hands of forces which are far from being reformist.

Of course, we may also view matters from another perspective. What would happen if Russia does not take part in the "Partnership?" In this case, can it change something in the realization of the program itself or achieve anything other than self-isolation? The latter question is of key importance, since the acceleration of Russia's integration into the all-European structures and the strengthening of international stability are associated with the realization of the "Partnership." It is quite obvious that the State Duma will strive to achieve real participation in ratification of the

agreement. Two paths of further action are emerging for the executive power. First, to ignore the legislators and move into the "Partnership." Technically this is possible if we present the "Partnership in the Name of Peace" as the framework of an international program, and not as a treaty which requires ratification. However, politically this is fraught with subsequent complications. The second means, which is more complex, is to try to convince public opinion and parliament of the expediency of the "Partnership in the Name of Peace" for Russia, and not only for NATO.

#### **Academics Urge Partnership for Peace Membership**

944Q0290A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
26 Mar 94 p 10

[Article by Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Konovalov, director of the United States and Canada Institute (ISKAN) Center for Military Policy and Systems Analysis, and Sergey Konstantinovich Oznobishchev, director of the ISKAN Center for Problems of International Security: "Partnership for Peace: The Road for Which Russia Has To Opt"]

[Text] "Many serious politicians in the West still believe that NATO should even now admit the countries of East and Central Europe to guard them against the instabilities and uncertainties of the development of the domestic political situation in Russia and possible relapses into imperial policy of the totalitarian state."

Various departments of the executive, primarily the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and the Security Council, have reached full agreement, it would seem, concerning the expediency for Russia of affiliation to the "Partnership for Peace" program proposed in January at the meeting of NATO heads of state in Brussels. This was shown clearly by the visit to Moscow of U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry. Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, expressed the assumption following the meeting with his American colleague that the corresponding document could be signed before the end of March. And although Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev was more guarded in his assessment of the timeframe necessary for preparation for this event, there is every reason to believe that it will happen quite soon.

At the same time, on the other hand, the decision on Russia's affiliation to the NATO initiative aroused increased interest on the part of the legislature, and special hearings were held in the State Duma on the ascertainment and evaluation of the consequences of affiliation to the Partnership for Peace, which showed that a number of the people's elect do not share the optimism of representatives of the departments concerning the fact that Russia's inclusion in this program would correspond to its interests. The debate in the press shows that opinions in this connection differ among independent experts also. Fears that affiliation to the program would reduce Russia's space for foreign policy maneuver and even lead to its dangerous political dependence on NATO are being expressed. Theorists from the ranks of the neo-state absolutists are



emphasizing that affiliation to the program would signify the creation of a "monocentric Europe and Russia's loss of the role of power center." But before attempting to take issue with sketches whose connection with the diversity of the political landscape would in itself seem arguable and to evaluate the consequences of such a step for Russia, we should clearly formulate what, in fact, is being offered our country and that with which, by all accounts, we have decided to associate.

Let us begin by saying that the mere fact of affiliation to the program of the Partnership for Peace (or PFP, as it is called for short in some analytical documents) by no means signifies a "deprivation of rights" and will not entail limitations of Russia's sovereignty or some strict financial obligations. The very adoption of this program was not so much a strategic initiative of NATO as a response to at least two outside factors.

On the one hand it is a question of concentrated pressure on the part of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which were endeavoring by might and main to join NATO and obtain guarantees of security against uncertainties of the political course and the possibility of a return of a totalitarian expansionist regime in Russia. On the other, a part was played by the active and cogent foreign policy course of Russia, which is endeavoring to prevent an expansion of the alliance and a new division of Europe. It was here, perhaps, that quite convincing arguments were found in support of the fact that an expansion of NATO would be contrary to its own long-term interests and would have negative consequences both for European security and for the prospects of democratic development and internal political stability in Russia itself.

Thus had there been no Partnership for Peace program, it would have to have been invented. For the West this program was largely a forced measure. It appeared as a compromise demonstrating on the one hand that the Western countries are prepared to take account of the reasonably formulated national-state interests of Russia and are not in the least interested in a destabilization of its already none-too-stable domestic political situation; on the other, the countries wishing to join NATO were offered the possibility of military-political cooperation, which puts off the question of their full membership of this organization indefinitely, although does not exclude it in principle. That is, in the difficult situation in January 1994 Russian diplomacy was able to score a pronounced success. This success should not now be lost in fruitless political debate but should be rapidly switched to the plane of real cooperation, it having been made undoubtedly attractive and beneficial for Russia.

The NATO initiative was formulated such as to permit quite a broad interpretation and the possibility of influence on its practical filling. Having approved the Partnership for Peace program, the leaders of the NATO countries expounded it in Brussels in two documents. One is a framework document and formulates the general principles and tasks of the program, the second is an invitation sent to potential partners wishing to associate with this initiative. It would seem that, following familiarization,

the first document should not give rise to protest even among the toughest opponents of the one-sided Atlantic "pro-West" orientation of Russian foreign policy inasmuch as it contains goals that are common and positive for each normal democratic state. These are assurance of civilian political control over the military sphere, an expansion of transparency and openness in the process of the discussion and adoption of military budgets, cooperation in the peacekeeping sphere, and so forth.

It is extremely important to emphasize that it is in fact anticipated that each signatory state will develop with NATO its own, individual partnership program, as it were. It has at the same time to be noted that the so-called "invitation" to participate in the Partnership for Peace program contains statements to the effect that the NATO states "would welcome its expansion thanks to democratic neighbors in the East" and that the program itself should perform an important role "in the process of the evolutionary expansion of NATO." So Russia, which has already adopted a decision on its affiliation to the Partnership for Peace program, will have to determine which versions of its practical realization are acceptable for it and, having made this decision, use its influence to ensure that participation in it correspond as much as possible to our long-term national interests. But it is essential for this to have a clear idea of what these interests consist. There is no such clarity as yet. The few documents on this score, "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" included, do not provide an answer to this question, although they do mention our country's "vitally important interests." True, the authors of the "Basic Provisions" allude to the fact that this document is merely a component of the overall concept of security, which has yet to be devised. But any military doctrine becomes a workable document only when it has support in the form of consensus among the main institutions of power. We are still a long way off from this here, it would seem. Thus any appeal to Russia's national interests with reference to "partnership for peace" cannot contain axioms and should be viewed on the basis of the sum total of evidence in support of this proposition or the other.

The question of whether it will not be too late after Russia has aligned itself with the initiative to think about its practical filling could arise. It would seem not inasmuch as formal affiliation to the PFP, that is, the signing of the framework document, is only the first procedural step—a kind of demonstration of intent. It should be followed by the elaboration of a "Presentation Document," which should formulate how Russia sees its participation in the program and the goals to whose achievement it aspires. Of course, it will be necessary here to do what Russia has traditionally disliked doing—display initiative, think, and act. It would be possible to opt for another approach which was proposed by an independent expert and which he formulated in a question which is almost Hamlet-like, but with a nuance of our national philosophy—"why join if it is possible not to join?"

This approach to foreign policy may be defined as entropic—minimizing the consumption of energy—but it

is far removed from the task of assurance of Russia's vital interests. Underlying it is a fear as to whether Russia, having affiliated with the program, could somehow influence it from within. Those who harbor such misgivings could be reminded (granted all the conditionality of historical analogies) how the Socialist Republic of Romania formerly displayed an independence, enviable and dangerous for those times, within the Warsaw Pact and influenced the policy of this bloc in its own interests. There is even reason to believe that Romania made its contribution to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, operating from within. So are Russia's possibilities to be doubted?

So which most important priorities of Russia's national security policy should be reflected in the "Presentation Document"? Russia categorically would not be suited by an expansion of NATO in the event of it remaining outside of this alliance. And it is not a question of the admittance of new members representing a direct military threat to it now or in the foreseeable future. Such an expansion would be perceived as Russia's military-political isolation and would predetermine the inevitability of a new division of Europe. Such a policy would be tantamount to the start of the building of a new version of the Berlin Wall, which would have moved considerably closer to Smolensk and Moscow, but would not for this reason have become a more positive factor of European security.

Many serious politicians in the West still believe that NATO should even now admit the countries of East and Central Europe to guard them against the instabilities and uncertainties of the development of the domestic political situation in Russia and possible relapses into imperial policy of the totalitarian state.

Unfortunately, Russian political reality affords grounds for such apprehensions. We are increasingly becoming a country not only with an "unpredictable past" but also an "unpredictable future." A number of objections to this could be found, but it is hard to dispute the fact that a resolution of a constitutional crisis with the engagement of a "limited contingent" of tanks and combat operations in the center of the capital did not serve to strengthen the conviction in Europe or throughout the world as to the irreversibility of the policy of reforms and democracy. And the results of the December elections by no means induced anyone to finally cast aside all doubts concerning the prospects of civilian democratic rule in Russia. Strobe Talbott, first deputy U.S. secretary of state, recently declared that he was worried about the fate of the democratic reforms in Russia and believes that, in the event of their failure and a recoil to totalitarianism in Russia, the Partnership for Peace initiative could serve also as a protective barrier against its expansion.

At the same time any serious expert is well aware that neither now nor in the foreseeable future will Russia, while remaining a strong military power, be in a position, for all that, to "project" this might outside of its national territory, even less outside of the territory of the former USSR. So what is the point of building a system of protection against a threat which does not exist and which cannot

appear in the near future, provoking internal political shifts in Russia that could, even though not rapidly, make this threat real.

This conclusion also testifies in support of the need for Russian affiliation to the Partnership for Peace program inasmuch as without it this initiative would become a NATO "preparatory class," and the entry into the alliance of new members would only be a matter of time. That is, it should be stated clearly that Russia will subscribe to the program, considering it essential to counterpose to the expansion of NATO a positive alternative—the creation within the framework of this program of the foundation of a future system of European security, in which Russia and the countries of East and Central Europe are subsequently integrated as NATO's equal partners.

At the same time, on the other hand, Russia's affiliation to the program with the aim of its speediest membership of NATO, before its former allies even, perhaps, would be, it would seem, a serious strategic mistake. It is the Eurasian aspect of Russia's interests that is important here. We would recall how the report prepared by the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation argued the unacceptability of an expansion of NATO for Russia. It pointed out as a most important reason that the very approach, without hostile intentions even, to the borders of Russia of a military grouping with such offensive potential as NATO would fundamentally change the military-strategic situation and compel it to adopt the appropriate countermeasures in the approaches to military organizational development, the disposition and number of force groupings deployed, and so forth.

We can imagine quite unambiguously the negative reaction of China or other Asian neighbors of Russia when it transpires that they border a new military-political alliance whose offensive potential is composed of the potentials of NATO, at least 16 other European countries, and Russia. It would certainly have to be recognized that the Asian states bordering Russia, primarily China, would in this case be entitled to take adequate steps, which would unequivocally have a negative effect on security and stability in the region and in the world as a whole. Consequently, it is essential even now to display concern to ensure that the building of a system of European security with Russia's participation not be perceived as a threat to the Muslim countries or China. It is essential that Russia display particular punctiliousness on this issue inasmuch as it is far more vulnerable than the European countries to possible retaliatory measures on the part of its Asian neighbors.

Another important argument expressed by opponents of the program in Russia consists of fears of a loss of the traditional markets for the sale of Russian arms in the European countries that formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Mr. Zatulin, chairman of the State Duma Committee for Relations with the CIS and Compatriots' Affairs, even indicates that Russia's affiliation to the Partnership for Peace would signify "the death of Russia's military-industrial complex." It would seem that such misgivings fail to take account of at least two factors. First, the NATO

program itself by no means implies a transition to some common standard weapons systems. As far as its further development is concerned, much here should depend on our own position.

Second, the talk about the death of Russia's military-industrial complex because of the loss of the East European markets would seem somewhat exaggerated for purely economic reasons. According to the figures of a most authoritative source in this sphere—the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—total arms exports from Russia in 1992 constituted \$2.043 billion, of which arms totaling \$139 million were sold to developed countries, to which our East European customers pertain, that is, less than 7 percent of the total. And whereas, what is more, our arms exports in the period 1990 through 1992 to the developing countries declined by a factor of 3.5, to the developed countries, by a factor of 22.4. So events on the arms markets in the East European countries undesirable for us were taking place even before the appearance of the Partnership for Peace program. What has been said by no means signifies that Russia should not fight for the possibility of sales of its arms to the East European countries. But the Partnership for Peace creates no obstacles to this. On the contrary, new opportunities, which, however, may be realized only in keen competitive struggle, could, possibly, emerge for Russia's military-industrial complex within the framework of this program.

One further fear voiced by the opponents of affiliation to the Partnership for Peace is connected with the fact that other states of the CIS would fasten onto this program also (some have already done so, others are about to) and that this would undermine the fragile prospects of military-political integration within the CIS that have begun to emerge. We should probably agree that the formulation of a coordinated approach to the NATO initiative on the part of the states of the CIS, the members of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty at least, would be advisable. But what has prevented or is preventing us doing this and discussing it within the CIS?

So the numerous declarations concerning the end of the cold war and our calls concerning the need for transition from confrontation to strategic partnership are beginning to move into the sphere of practical action. Russia should undoubtedly take this step. It would be incomprehensible, to say the least, why we, who have said so much about our aspiration to partner relations, would suddenly attempt to distance ourselves from them, condemning ourselves to self-isolation. Participation in them would by no means signify a disregard for Russia's national interests. But what would undoubtedly have to be renounced would be clichés of confrontational thinking and bipolar, trench logic.

It should be regretfully acknowledged that the transition to partner relations with the West has occurred largely in words, at the declarative level, and has affected to a considerably lesser extent the sphere of actual policy. The presence, as before, of the inordinately military component of our superpower status, nuclear weapons included,

and the extreme internal political instability demand particular attention and dictate the need for Russia's affiliation to the Partnership for Peace program on special terms (the nature thereof could be agreed preliminarily and formalized in an individual partnership program). Nonetheless, it is impossible to confine ourselves to these considerations. Russia has performed and will continue to perform an outstanding role in Europe and the world not only in the military-political respect. No serious analyst even today could dispute the presence in our country of enormous potential in literally all spheres.

The normal workmanlike process not only of Russia's affiliation to this program but also of our country's entry into partner relations is being hampered by the evolved nature of the discussion of most important foreign policy questions, which can often only be called discussion by stretching the point. The actual path of the formulation of decisions and the role and place therein of the newly elected parliament, which for some reason or other joined in the discussion of "partnership" when the executive had in practice already determined the timeframe of Russia's entry into this program, would seem chaotic, as before. Discussion of any important matter, the Partnership for Peace included, is frequently regarded not from the viewpoint of Russia's actual interests but through the prism of the opportunist interests of politicians' extension of the time of their stay in the upper echelons of power (particularly with the prospect of new elections for everyone within two years).

It is clear that performing purposeful work on the elaboration of policy and on the assurance of Russia's national interests, within the framework of "partnership" included, is far more complex than "not joining." After all, it is in this key sphere for future security that there have been more words than deeds. It is a long time since we heard our own proposals in this field, not simply belated "responses" to the development of events. Nor, finally, would it do any harm to determine our position as regards the basic postulates of the foundation of all partner relations—Russia's national interests and their priorities.

It was recently learned, incidentally, that Switzerland, which is proud of its long neutrality, has decided to affiliate with the Partnership for Peace in the near future. It does not intend to renounce its neutral status, is not planning to join NATO, and is not even about to take part in joint military maneuvers. At the same time, on the other hand, Switzerland is unwilling to remain aloof from the process of military-political integration in Europe. But if such a small state is not afraid to align itself with the program, should Russia be guided by baseless fears?

**Ovinnikov Insists on Russia's Equality With West**  
944Q0296A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 12,  
5 Apr 94 [Signed to press 29 Mar 94] p 4

[Article by Richard Ovinnikov, doctor of historical sciences, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, under rubric "Diplomatic Paths": "Russia's Inalienable Rights: Memorandum for Foreign-Political Partners"]



[Text] The East-West confrontation and the Cold War have come to an end. On the horizon is the coming into being of a new model of the world. In overall features that model must be based on cooperation among states and, naturally, must include the Russia Federation as an integral part.

Nevertheless there is something not quite right in this rosy haze, in any case for us Russians. Too many questions have accumulated to make it possible to ponder on them aloud. But the most important point is the following: on the part of certain of our partners, unlike the rather good declarations, one actually senses the deaf imperception of Russia's legal rights in the international arena, which are equal to other inalienable rights of Russia. Such as those that the carrying out of which, for themselves, these partners reckon in the rank of natural national interests. Such as those that Russia intends to promote not in order to bypass the generally accepted behavioral norms for states, but strictly within their confines.

In this situation it is apparently beneficial to prepare a business memorandum for our partners (as well as for ourselves) that is aimed at removing any misunderstandings. A memorandum, first of all, about the healthy and constructive, in our view, strivings of Russia in the outside world, and, secondly, about why it is difficult for us to accept our partners' lack of readiness to take them into consideration.

The first is, indisputably, the right of the Russian Federation to be reborn as a great power, the right to eliminate the frustrated position in which it has found itself.

This task is not a challenge to anyone, but it is a defense of national interests. Situations that were extremely similar after World War II were De Gaulle's course aimed at restoring the grandeur of France and the restoration by China of its positions as a great power. No one saw anything unnatural in this. Therefore one would scarcely think that it is possible to agree with the fact that similar strivings by Russia are being treated today as imperial vanities. Moreover, this is being presented on the level of the most highly placed foreign-political leaders of the recent past and as a conceptual theory: allegedly the "constant threat" against the West is immanently inherent through the centuries to any Russia, "tsarist or Soviet" (H. Kissinger), or, as a subvariant, to "Great Russian imperialism" (Z. Brezinski).

What are unacceptable are the sometimes cutting, albeit on another level, expectations that are directly hostile to Russia. Unfortunately, there are plenty of examples. A research study by the Carnegie Foundation in Washington that was published on the eve of last year predicted that the Russian Federation would not survive the year 1993 and would collapse. The London *ECONOMIST*, in its turn, gave the following predictions on the same subject: "This disintegration is not necessarily bad... Everything depends on whether that disintegration will be orderly."

The second is Russia's inalienable right to security that is equal with other powers.

For every country the primary guarantee of security is to assure that there are no complications on the part of neighbors, and that their territory does not become a corridor through which third forces can travel. The removal of this problem by political methods, on the basis of voluntary cooperation, is universally positive in its consequences. That was the situation with the understanding between France and Germany, which countries undertook, after confrontation in two world wars, to establish smooth bilateral relations. The United States and Canada, which also waged war with one another at one time, refused to reinforce their common border, actually integrating their military organizations. That is their right.

The striving by the Russian Federation to prevent at least a movement backward in its own security is therefore logical. Hence the desire to preserve the reliable ties in this area that developed among the current CIS countries. This is the sphere of the previous single military structure, and one sees preserved in it both the important strong points of Russia itself, and the joint interest of the CIS participants in taking joint action. But wherever, as in the Baltic and East Europe, cooperation in guaranteeing security is rejected by the other side, Russia proceeds from the critical minimum. Namely, not to be faced by a situation in which the former republics of the USSR and its previous allies are included in a military bloc of which Russia is not a member.

The third is the legal right of the Russian Federation to lack of discrimination in the world economy. Russians do not feel that someone else is supposed to pull their country out of its current difficulties. This is their own task. But what Russia naturally expects if the proposal is made that it become integrated into the world economy is to have completely equal conditions.

The time has come to remove the trade, economic, and other barriers. But, instead of this, quota limitations sometimes appear. And it is completely improper to strive to use our problems as a lever for exerting pressure. Just as, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance, the creditor banks in the London Club would like to pay off our debts by means of the forced sale of Russia's property abroad.

Finally, the Russian Federation has the undisputed right to have its special interests taken into consideration in the international situations that are important to it.

The specific concerns of any country are more the norm than an exception. It is only important for good will to be manifested and for the partner's interests to be taken into consideration. Just as, for example, it is typical for the relations between the United States and Japan.

Thus, the present factual situation can scarcely cause satisfaction. In the proclaimed postconfrontational world it is still a long way to truly parity partner relations, at least to the extent that this pertains to respect for the rights and interests of the Russian Federation.

**Russia Expects CE Membership Before Year's End**

944Q0283B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Nikita Yermakov: "Russian Parliamentarism Receives International Recognition: Vladimir Shumeyko's First Official Visit Abroad"]

[Text] Paris—Over the entire past week, the French capital was host to the scheduled 91st session of the Interparliamentary Union, which currently unites 128 parliaments in the world. Participating in its work in the capacity of chairman of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly allowed the head of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament to take part in the discussion of some of the most burning issues on the agenda—prevention of conflicts and the United Nations' role in this; ensuring the safety of industrial waste storage; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Of all the meetings, the most significant were those held with the heads of the French National Assembly and the Senate, as well as in Strasbourg with the Council of Europe [CE] leadership.

"At this point Franco-Russian parliamentary relations are still not on an equal footing," says Vladimir Shumeyko. "France has lived under a parliamentary system for about 100 years, Russia—since 12 December of last year."

One way or the other, however, the dialogue, in which both parties speak the same language, has begun. It was especially noticeable during the negotiations in Strasbourg. The topic was Russia's membership of the Council of Europe.

Until now, the situation was as follows: Russia, which had the status of a special-invitation observer in the CE, was refused membership in the organization until it acquired a democratic constitution and a democratically elected parliament. Now these conditions have been met, but the CE leadership was in no hurry to consider Moscow's request until the very last moment. According to informed sources, such caution was the result not only of the unpredictability of Russia's development, which is frightening to some here, but also, among other things, of the fact that in the past the Russian side was insisting that exceptions be made for it, and on immediate and unconditional membership in the CE. Now that the Russian participants in the dialogue have changed, these demands have been withdrawn. After the negotiations in Strasbourg, the procedure of acceptance will begin—quite long and in stages, actually. There are all reasons to believe, the Russian side assures, that as early as the fall, or under any circumstances before the end of the year, Russia may become a full-fledged member of the Council of Europe, and feel like a normal democratic power, participating in the solution of European problems in this capacity.

**Revival of Cooperation With Arab World Urged**

944Q0284A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 30 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Vasilii Lipitskiy: "The East Remains Silent: Russia's Abandonment of One-Sided Atlantism Is Possible Only With a More Active Position of the Arab World"]

[Text] The Arab world is looking on with inexplicable indifference as its long-term strategic interests and, perhaps, foundations of prosperity also are being undermined in Russia. What this is: traditional submission to fate and recognition of its impotence or, on the contrary, some subtle calculation, is unclear. The East is, as always, enigmatic and obscure for the European mind.

The formerly firm ties with Arab world have come to be regarded—even though this has not been recorded in official documents—as the onerous legacy of the ancien regime and as communist geopolitics. Truly, there was in these ties that which is not usually greatly to the liking of the public at large—indirect participation in regional conflicts, arms trade, and support for rulers unpopular in the world. But there were undoubted pluses also—mutually profitable economic relations and influence in the vast region. All this has been sacrificed to ideological changes.

But it would be an exaggeration to say that the door to Russia was suddenly slammed shut in the face of the Arab countries and to place the whole responsibility with the Russian side. It is simply that the West was better able to take advantage of the favorable political conditions. The Arab world failed to display the necessary mobility, yielding important strategic positions practically without resistance. And this in a situation where its interests were objectively very close to Russian interests.

Russian producers, desperately in need of currency receipts, are prepared to sell their products for a pittance even. The result is a catastrophic fall in the price of oil and many types of mineral raw material. Farsighted emissaries of the West are penetrating Russia's oil and gas complex ever more deeply and endeavoring to participate in the control of the extractive sectors. Considering the calamitous position of the latter, it is clear how easy this is—all investments are seen as a blessing.

It is not hard to foresee in the near future a further decline in the influence of the Organization of Oil-Exporting Countries and a fall in the revenue of the traditional producers of mineral raw material. And a further strengthening of the positions of the West and an increase in the gap between North and South. And although Russia is geographically a northern country, economically it will shortly be somewhere around the Equator, but without an improvement in climate. Arab investments in Russia's oil and gas complex of the appropriate scale offered on favorable terms against subsequent partnership could appreciably adjust this joyless prospect. But the East remains silent.

Another sphere of the concurrence of the objective interests of Russia and the Arab countries is the arms trade. In

the Russian Federation the manufacture of weapons is one of the few competitive industries. It is in a state of the most profound crisis in connection with demilitarization and the loss of a number of traditional markets: Iraq, Libya, Palestine. The Arab world remains the most attractive partner for our arms manufacturers. But the Atlantic orientation of our foreign policy and the growing direct dependence on the West are becoming an insurmountable barrier to mutually profitable relations.

Here also the Arab world, having aroused the direct producers' interest by investments, could rectify matters. But dealers from the East are not to be seen at the defense plants, which are being forced to halt their production lines one after the other.

In a social and cultural respect the Western world is closer to Russia than the Arab East. But the structure of economic interests should be a far more important imperative for politicians.

How is the situation to be changed? Serious political changes and the renunciation of the one-sided Atlantism of foreign policy are needed for this in Russia. But such changes, in turn, are possible only with the more active position of the Arab world.

Assistance to Russia and investments in its economy are at the present time a risky and overhead-laden business. The West is, nonetheless, agreeing to this in the name of its future and its strategic interests.

The Arab world, which possesses considerable spare financial resources, should put them to use if it wishes in the future also to be a pronounced factor of geopolitics and to retain the possibility of participation in control of the world oil market. This means not only replacing the West where this is possible—in the investment process—but also offering better terms. And if the West declines assistance programs in the face of this reorientation of Russia, being prepared to compensate the losses connected with this.

Whether the proposed scenario proves another oriental legend will depend solely on the capacity of Arab and Russian politicians for recognizing imperatives dictated by the national interests of both parties.

#### **Concern Over Possible Limits on Transport Via Turkish Straits**

944Q0293A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 1 Apr 94 p 4

[Article by Professor Ilya Mogilyovkin: "Russia's Transportation Connections Are Jeopardized: The Problem of the Black Sea Straits Is on the Agenda Again." The article is under the rubric "Law."]

[Text] More and more reports are coming out about Turkey's intentions to attain changes in the Convention governing the procedures for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles that connect the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The issue concerns a change that is very important for Russia's interests, the so-called Montreux Convention, signed in 1936 by twelve countries, including the USSR

and Turkey. This convention provides for the free passage of freighters of all countries through the straits and contains procedures for the passage of warships of countries bordering on the Black Sea, as well as other countries.

The Black Sea straits are of vital interest for Russia's maritime trade and that of other Black Sea countries. In recent times, up to 16,000 vessels per year have passed through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits. Of the freight transported, especially important are exports of oil and natural gas. Their share of the total volume transported is over 60 percent.

Now Turkey is trying to establish more stringent rules for the passage of vessels in a number of categories. Accordingly, vessels carrying oil or any dangerous cargo must inform the relevant Turkish authorities at least 24 hours prior to the proposed passage. A much stricter regulation is supposed to apply to tankers equipped with nuclear engines or to those having nuclear waste or chemical freight on board. Captains will have to receive permission for through passage from the Turkish Secretariat for Naval Affairs and take a local navigator on board. In essence, therefore, what is being planned for implementation is not a procedure to inform, but to have to request permission for certain categories of ships to pass through the Straits. Meanwhile, it is known that under these procedures, ships could be delayed while permission is being sought.

Moreover, according to available information, Turkey has announced that in the future it does not intend to permit passage of supertankers through the Straits.

Turkish authorities, in giving reasons for their intention to institute new procedures for passage of civilian freighters through the Black Sea straits, are saying that tankers could present an ecological danger for Istanbul and other maritime cities in the event of an accident in the Bosphorus.

Turkey's intent to change the procedures in the straits directly touch upon Russian interests, since over a half of all goods carried by Russian vessels engaged in maritime trade go through the Black Sea straits. Specifically, Russia principally loads oil and other liquid materials for export in Black Sea ports. In connection with this, even recognizing the need for taking ecological requirements into consideration, Russia's concern cannot be ignored when her fundamental interests are at stake.

Russia's concern is all the more justified because the Turkish initiative to change the procedures cannot be examined in isolation from a whole number of important issues.

After the fall of the USSR, Russia was faced with an overall serious deterioration in her transport and communications systems, especially in the most important connecting routes with the West through the Baltics and Ukraine. Under these conditions, preservation of Russian interests that depend upon uninterrupted sea transport through the Black Sea and the straits becomes immensely important.



At the same time, very weighty concepts are being raised from a legal point of view with regard to the Turkish initiative.

The limitations on free passage of commercial vessels through the Black Sea straits, as proposed by Turkey, are in conflict with the Montreux Convention now in force. For this reason, the question arises about how present legal procedures will influence vessel passage in the future, not only in the Black Sea straits, but also in other international straits, including those where maritime commerce is important for Russia too. In other words, changing procedures in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles may serve as a dangerous precedent for certain other straits.

The attempt to change the Montreux Convention, if the change takes place, also raises the question about possible legal reference points that may be selected for approving procedures for the passage of ships. Without any doubt, the most authoritative document is the UN Convention on Maritime Law signed in 1982 and subsequently ratified by many countries. It would not be right to ignore this important document when looking into possible changes in procedures.

At the same time, it is extremely important to delineate as clearly as possible Russian interests under new and not so simple transport and communications conditions. In so doing, it is essential to take into account not only the Black Sea straits themselves, but also the "overall" significance of the straits problem for Russia, as was mentioned above. This is why it is very important that problems with regard to the Straits be resolved as openly and publicly as possible. It would be highly desirable for the press to devote its attention to these problems and to inform the broadest possible readership about these problems. The multifaceted nature of the straits problem affects the interests of many people in Russia, both as an industrial and a regional issue.

Only if these issues are broadly and constantly brought up by the mass media will it be possible to avert serious losses similar to those that Russia is suffering now in many aspects of her transport ties with the near abroad, as well as with more distant foreign countries.

**RF Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia Discussed**  
944Q0271A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 22 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Sergey Vostrikov, candidate of historical sciences: "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia—The Ethics of Pragmatism and Common Sense"]

[Text] It is generally known that for the international influence of any state, "professionalism of foreign policy is very important." (F.M. Burlatskiy, A.A. Galkin. "The Modern Leviathan." Moscow: MYSL, 1985, p. 317). An accurate assessment of the correlation of forces, the ability to determine a precise position under adverse conditions, the ability to select proper allies and partners—may compensate to a certain degree for diminished economic potential and retarded dynamics of development. This is especially urgent for the Russia of today, which for certain

reasons is undergoing one of the most critical periods of its history. In order to avoid failure and subjective defeats under such conditions, the foreign policy of the state must be equal to the situation being endured. This can be done, in our view, only if policy is based on fully realistic and rational foundations which conform first and foremost to the interests of Russia itself, and not on mythical or abstract concepts oriented on theoretical considerations removed from real life.

We are talking about bringing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation into conformance with the principles comprising the basis of foreign policy activity of the developed democracies that constitute reference points for Russia. In effecting the transition to a market economy, we must not forget that "capitalism brought along with it the ethics of pragmatism, the ethics of common sense. A lofty idealism resided in its slogans of freedom, equality, and brotherhood, but it was an idealism based on a sensible, utilitarian accounting of realities." (A.N. Yakovlev. "Prelude. Cataclysm. Epilogue." Moscow: NOVOSTI, 1992, p. 276). It is pragmatism and common sense, in our view, that would advisably be put at the foundation of the foreign policy strategy of the Russian state under today's conditions. From this point of view the question of selection of priority partners may be examined—with respect to both the "near" and "far" abroad.

Relations with its great neighbor of the Far East—China—will be of primary and vital significance to the Russian Federation. These affect not just the interests of Russia in Asia, but the entirety of Russia's international policy. As it develops in dynamic fashion, China is today playing an ever more prominent role in the Asia-Pacific region. "No single Asian power in the Asia-Pacific region has at its disposal the universal and powerful influence that belongs to the People's Republic of China." (S.V. Solodovnik. "Stability in Asia—Russia's Priority." MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1992, No. 2, p. 88). Expert analyses predict that in the future, China will be quite capable of assuming a leading position in world politics (a number of analysts even predict that the People's Republic of China will turn into a superpower in the 21st century). An expansion of mutually advantageous cooperation with the PRC will conform to Russia's interests in developing its economic infrastructure in the Maritime Kray region, Siberia, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka. In the long term, should events develop favorably, it is felt that the Chinese "springboard" could facilitate to a certain degree the emergence of Russian capital in the markets of Southeast Asia, where Chinese business "is a permanent element of the socioeconomic structure of countries of the region." (S. Goncharenko. "Partners or Competitors—How Regional Chinese Capital Operates in the Countries of Southeast Asia." VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, 1992, No. 3, p. 113).

The experience of the PRC's transition to a market economy is interesting in many respects and may prove quite useful to the Russian Federation (especially since when one takes a sober look at things, it is impossible not to see that during a historically short period of time the

PRC has been able to approach the real market far more closely than the Russian Federation, where a greater role has been devoted to talk).

In laying the foundation of Russian-Chinese relations today, we are obliged to proceed from the long-term perspective, first and foremost from a clear realization of the immutable fact that China and Russia are fated to be neighbors forever, regardless of whether one is pleased at this or not.

Of great significance to the security of Russia's interests in the South and Central Asian regions is the preservation of continuity in the development of relations with India. Settlement of the problem of India's payment to Russia of its long-term state credit debt opens up broad opportunities for the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the sphere of trade, shipping, space research, modern technology exchange, and exchanges in the military-technical sphere. India's implementation of a large-scale program of economic reforms, during which it "opens up new spheres for the application of capital" (FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA, 18-24 February 1993) will create favorable conditions for Russian investors, joint-stockholders, and private entrepreneurial structures. Since time immemorial the peoples of India and Russia have come to share deep-rooted traditions of humanitarian and cultural cooperation. In addition, expansion of the Russia-India political partnership contributes towards the consolidation of stability in Hindustan and throughout Central Asia as well. This is of major significance to Russia.

Prospects for developing and intensifying ties with Russia's Eurasian "twin"—Turkey—appear to be promising and advantageous for Russia. Quite a number of historic parallels can be seen in the development of the two countries. Over the course of centuries, Turkey, like Russia, has played the part of a unique "bridge" between East and West, not belonging to one or the other. Like its northern neighbor, Turkey has had to endure the agonizing process of surmounting the empire syndrome and effecting transition to a modern (secular) model of state structure. Today Turkey, just like Russia, is resolving complex problems of economic modernization. The history of Russo-Turkish relations records a great many pages of drama and even tragedy. At the same time, the past also contains a positive experience of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey of the days of Kemal Ataturk. The similarity of historical experience and economic systems of the two countries presupposes their compatibility and complementary nature. This experience is also valuable because today in Russia and other CIS states, "with the conduct of liberalization of the economy, a number of trends are being observed that operated in Turkey during the 1980's. They deal with the fate of state enterprises, pace and forms of privatization, and development of the financial market." (S. Avdashev. "Turkey—A National Model of Liberalization of the Economy." 1992, No. 11, p. 101). Nor would it be in Russia's interests to ignore the strong influence Turkey has in the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Black Sea region.

Capability for a constructive and highly effective relationship is seen in the prospects for partnership between a renewed Russia and Israel, where a tremendous Russian-speaking community has formed that exerts significant influence on the political, economic, and cultural life of the state. "One-fourth are our former people"—as the words of the famous poet express it. This is not only a natural and vital element linking the two countries, but a powerful factor of rapprochement between Russia and Israel as well. Repatriates from Russia have significant capacities at their disposal for rendering intermediary services in trade between the West and Russia, in investing capital in the Russian Federation economy on a long-term basis, and in implementing joint projects in both countries. Prospects appear good for cooperation in the development of tourism, trade in subtropical crops, processing and sale of diamonds, and in the sphere of scientific research. The development of relations between Russia and Israel would provide a weighty contribution to stabilization of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, facilitating settlement of one of the most deep-rooted and complex problems of modern times—the problem of the Near East. It is important to emphasize in this regard that the deepening of Russian-Israeli relations cannot and must not be effected at the expense or to the detriment of Russia's traditional ties with the Arab world (in particular, with Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Kuwait). On the whole, orientation on the Near East should, in our view, constitute one of the priority directions in foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation in Asia.

In the "near" abroad, of exceptionally great long-term relevance to the national security and interests of our state is Kazakhstan, covering the "soft underbelly" of Russia and linking it with the countries of Central Asia at the same time. The geographic position of Kazakhstan, its virgin lands, natural and raw-material resources, developed industrial infrastructure, and the largest Russian-speaking diaspora outside the borders of the Russian Federation make it objectively urgently necessary to effect the very closest coordination and integration (a "strategic alliance," if you will) in all spheres of activity between Russia and Kazakhstan.

The traditional gravitation of Armenia towards Russia is to a great extent the result of the particular features of its historical development and geopolitical situation. Occupying a central position in the Transcaucasus and essentially constituting the "key" to all of Asia Minor, Armenia is located at a unique juncture of two worlds—the Christian and Islamic worlds. Such a position has its obvious pluses as well as minuses. Armenia's advantageous geographic position, its solid intellectual potential, and the presence of a large and diversified diaspora in many countries of the world, including in Russia itself, make prospects for the development of stable and all-encompassing cooperation between Russia and Armenia quite promising.

Rich mineral and energy resources, developed livestock-breeding, climatological and balneological factors, and the presence of suitable economic "recesses," have created

favorable preconditions for cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Not of minor significance to the Russian Federation is the presence in Kyrgyzstan of a large Russian-speaking community that plays an important role in the socioeconomic and scientific life of the state.

The high-priority nature of relations between Russia and Uzbekistan has been determined by an aggregate of factors in the geostrategic, economic, and cultural spheres, as well as by historical tradition. The heart of the "mid-territory" of the Central Asian region, Uzbekistan "is not only a buffer zone, the boundary between the former USSR and the Islamic countries, but is the place where new ideas and the reality of a new world structure intersect." (M. Timonina. "They Are Aided By the Black Rock, We—By the Golden Crucifix" SOTSIIUM, 1992, No. 6, p. 41). The interdependence of the economies of the two states, trade ties that have become a permanent fixture, and civilized and humanitarian traditions going back centuries upon centuries constitute a solid foundation for profitable cooperation on a broad scale.

In this manner, with all the dissimilarity, diversity, and nonuniformity with respect to the above-enumerated countries, there exist certain substantive aspects and features that are intrinsic to a greater or lesser degree to practically all of them. It is these most typical features which, in our view, could be laid within the foundation of a system of criteria for selecting priority partners in both the "near" and "far" abroad. Their universal nature makes it possible, in our view, to utilize this system beyond the boundaries of the Asian continent as well.

Thus, in selecting priority partners for the Russian Federation abroad, the main focus of attention must be concentrated on the following fundamental parameters:

- mutual compatibility of economies, approximate comparability of economic development;
- "key" nature of the geopolitical position of partners;
- internal stability;
- the secular principle in organization of state power.

We know that the main foreign policy task of any state is to ensure its internal development. As it applies to Russia's present conditions, this means primarily the preservation of the country's economic potential and the safeguarding of political stability, and not simply physical survival within the existing state borders. Proceeding from this, the economy must be set as the cornerstone, while the foreign policy itself of the Russian Federation is subordinated to economic interests. Such pragmatism in policy does not constitute anything extraordinary—quite a number of countries in the world espouse such an approach to their benefit. Nor does this run contrary to the interests of the world community. Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the above-mentioned partners will enable it to actively participate in collective efforts to resolve regional conflicts in the Near East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia, thus contributing significantly to the consolidation of international stability.

Rivalry in the international arena remains with us and will continue in the post-confrontational world. Under these conditions, only sober calculations, realism, and pragmatism can guarantee the success of foreign policy efforts. Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev heaped severe criticism upon abstract doctrinaires in politics who proclaimed general principles without regard to relevant vital tasks and the given moment in history. "The oversimplified abnegation of problems and the specifics of the history in which any politics is formed is an indicator of mediocrity or superficiality in this area," he emphasized, "or a lack of interest in this sphere of existence, an absence of calling to it." (A.N. Berdyayev. "The Fate of Russia." Moscow: 1990, p. 215). These words are exceedingly relevant today. It is entirely apparent that even today the adjective "free" as it pertains to Russia "is still very difficult for our top brass to utter..." (Yu. Boldyrev. "The Russian Era." IZVESTIYA, 6 February 1993). It is therefore entirely logical to assume that without freedom of thought, freedom to choose our own path of development, freedom to determine our own Russian interests and priorities, the danger of dogmatism in the foreign policy sphere will continue to exist.

#### **Lack of RF Efforts To Develop Cooperation With Vietnam Noted**

944Q0283A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 94  
p 3

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Viktor Pritula: "All Flags Come To Visit, Except Russian"]

[Text] Hanoi—*The economic blockade of Vietnam is lessening by the day. The Americans, for instance, understand very well that any prospective economic niche will be filled by their competitors. Even Austria did not remain out of the action. Its government delegation signed an agreement on construction of various communications projects.*

I cannot cease being amazed by the powers of observation and wit of my friend Linh Van Nhan. A specialist on Russia, he regularly watches information programs on the "Ostankino" channel. And once in a while comments on them. His latest comment: "The ghost of the unforgettable Leonid Ilich has returned to the Kremlin."

"What makes you think so?" I ask, perplexed.

"From watching Clinton's visit," replies Linh Van Nhan, without blinking an eye. "You know very well how such historic visits used to be covered in the past on the 'Vremya' program."

Needless to say, the dean of the Russian language department had me flat on my back. True, in those "stagnation times" that have already become part of mythology, when Linh Van Nhan was a student at Voronezh University, Central Television was under the direction of Suslov, the country's chief ideologist. Naturally, all events involving our general secretary "for life" were presented as historic milestones. Whenever someone visited Moscow, "Vremya" expanded beyond any size.



For the Vietnamese press, television, and radio that are not infected with "Ostankino" syndrome, the main news is still closer to Vietnam.

For instance, much has been written about the visit to the Vietnamese capital of prominent French political figure Jacques Chirac. The mayor of Paris, who has his sights on the presidency, decided—as did current president Mitterrand—to build a solid bridge with the countries of Indochina, on the reasonable assumption that in the future they will take their proper place in the dynamically developing Asia-Pacific corridor. In conversation with the Vietnamese leadership, Chirac emphasized many times that France attaches priority significance to developing relations with Vietnam. And this is not a mere declaration. In terms of investment in the Vietnamese economy, France is third in the world after Hong Kong and Taiwan, and first in Europe.

One of the permanent foreign policy topics in the Vietnamese mass media is the host of American delegations that have descended on Vietnam. Congressmen, senators, and businessmen have begun to frequent it. Still, business rules politics, no matter how the latter may try to subordinate it. Representatives of IBM, General Motors, AT&T, Kodak, and a number of other companies held consultations with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai as part of the research group of American industrialists and political scientists.

At a meeting with journalists, Ho The Lan, a representative of the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs press department, read out a long list of foreign delegations planning to visit Vietnam. There were no delegations from Russia and the CIS countries on that list. I have to admit that I am tired of repeating the reasoning regarding the potential benefits of cooperation with Vietnam. Therefore, today I will not do so. Let those Russian officials who visited Vietnam last year do it. They promised cooperation to the Vietnam side. And they were not the only ones. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin himself talked to Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Manh Cam last fall in Moscow. It is hard to tell, though, how much these promises are worth.

But should we become like those Russian diplomats in Hanoi who, in a pique of temper, accused local journalists of not being objective in their coverage of Russian realities?

The discouraged Vietnamese colleagues, deprived of the propaganda materials they used to get from the now-abolished Hanoi bureau of RIA-NOVOSTI, are hurt by this allegation flung at them by the diplomats.

"Is what we publish about Russia or show on television not true?" one of the journalists asked me.

"Unfortunately, it is," I replied.

### 'Difficult' State of Russian-Pakistani Trade Relations

944Q0289A Moscow *FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA*  
in Russian 31 Mar 94-6 Apr 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Trade With Russia Awaits Better Times"]

[Text] 1993 proved to be a difficult year for Russian-Pakistani economic relations. The volume of mutual trade between the two countries declined by about 40 percent for the year, and comprised only \$40 million.

The main reason for the decline was the refusal of the Pakistani side to deliver goods to be credited toward the repayment of long-term state credits. The former Soviet Union granted these credits for the purchase of Soviet equipment for the metallurgical plant which was built with the technical assistance of the USSR on the shore of the Indian Ocean near Karachi.

A dispute arose over parity between the Russian ruble and the Pakistani rupee. Pakistan demanded—and, we might add, quite unexpectedly—that it be reviewed in the direction of increasing the "price" of the rupee. In fact this means a significant reduction in the debt obligations. In 1993, Pakistan should have delivered approximately \$40 million worth of goods to Russia. However, it did not do so, and a foreign debt liability was formed for the first time. However, Russian economic experts working in the trade representation in Islamabad are not losing optimism. In their words, the problem of parity of currencies will be resolved and the indebtedness repaid in the nearest time, especially since the contracts for delivery of Pakistani goods for this sum have already been concluded.

Russia supplies a considerable amount of machine building products to Pakistan. These include textile looms, tractor assemblies, universal machine tools and instruments, electric motors, transformers, automatic machines, sheet metal, as well as cotton fabrics. Russia imports large quantities of ready-made clothing, tricot goods and linen from Pakistan, including men's shirts, shoes and sporting goods of various assortment. Pakistani sugar may also be of interest to us.

Russian and Pakistani experts believe that, despite the reduction in commodity exchange between the two countries, the prospects for economic cooperation of the two countries remain rather favorable. We are speaking primarily of the expansion of the metallurgical plant near Karachi from a capacity of 1.1 million tonnes to 3 million tonnes. Russia has agreed to grant Pakistan a credit in the amount of \$100 million.

The crowning touch in the successful cooperation of power producers may be the construction of a nuclear power plant. Islamabad has already appealed to Moscow with a request regarding its construction. However, as yet there has been no reply. At the same time, so as not to evoke the suspicions of the international community, Pakistan is preparing to place the future nuclear power plant under the control of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

Pakistan is also interested in acquiring Russian weapons. Experts cite primarily the MIG-29 and Su-27 combat aircraft, as well as tanks. There is talk of buying 300 tanks, with the subsequent development of tank-building capacities in the country. There is interest also in artillery weapons and submarines. However, many political and financial questions still remain unresolved up until the present time. Moreover, there is an actively operating pro-French and pro-Chinese lobby in Islamabad. The former is "pushing" primarily combat planes for Pakistan, and the latter—tanks. Russia has unexpectedly encountered competition in the Pakistani military market from the former Warsaw Pact member countries, and even from Ukraine.

The Russian trade representation in Islamabad sees a reserve for expanded economic cooperation with Pakistan and for the renewal of shipping of Pakistani cargo on vessels bearing the Russian flag. Previously, the USSR transported \$70-80 million worth of cargo annually from Pakistan to Europe and back. Now Russian vessels are rare guests in the Pakistani ports.

**Foreign Investment Inhibited by Tax Laws**  
944Q0289B Moscow *FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA*  
in Russian 24-30 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Sergey Pepelyayev, candidate in juridical sciences: "Instability of Tax Legislation Inhibits Foreign Investors"]

[Text] The changes in the tax system and lack of coordination between the standards of tax legislation and the legislation on foreign investments are conditioning an arbitrary approach in the actions of the local tax inspections. The instructions of the Minfin [Ministry of Finance] and the Gosnalogsluzhba [State Tax Service] still do not facilitate any clarification of the situation.

Russian taxpayers learned the price of tax laws long ago. Any of their articles may be "interpreted" by the Gosnalogsluzhba or Minfin in such a way that the initially intended meaning is entirely lost. Some statutes may simply be ignored by the agencies of executive power. This has happened repeatedly. For example, this has been the case with the prohibition on making the standard tax statutes retroactive.

However, the edict issued on 27 September 1993 by the RF [Russian Federation] President, "On Improving Work With Foreign Investments," was believed immediately and evaluated as the issuance of a real legal guarantee for the effective implementation of capital investments. The edict specified that newly issued normative statutes regulating the conditions of functioning of foreign and joint enterprises on the territory of Russia shall not apply for a period of 3 years to enterprises which existed at the moment these statutes went into effect.

Taxation is one of the significant conditions for the functioning of enterprises, and the question of stability of the tax legislation is a particularly acute one. With the issuance of the edict, the problem, it would seem, has been resolved: On most of the territory of the former USSR, the

possibility of planning activity several years in advance has once again emerged. Foreign companies and SP [joint ventures] have undertaken the compilation of long-term programs. However, once again the enterprises have been betrayed by their faith in the fact that the presidential edict is capable of withstanding the onslaught of departmental instructions.

In December of last year, routine changes were introduced into the tax system: The rates of a number of taxes were increased, the procedure for filing and payment of taxes was changed, and new payments were introduced. The foreign companies and joint ventures were not overly worried by this event, since they believed themselves (and many still do) protected against any unfavorable innovations in the tax sphere. However, as evidenced by numerous appeals by foreign companies and joint ventures, the local tax inspections maintain that the 3-year benefit on tax relations should not be applied, since "taxes are not related to the conditions of functioning of the enterprises." Since these statements bear a mass character, we may speak of an official position of the Gosnalogsluzhba and Minfin in regard to the edict, "On Improving Work With Foreign Investors." However, this time they have chosen the tactics of omission: In the letter of the Gosnalogsluzhba regarding the procedure for applying the new tax regulations, the 3-year benefit rule is absent.

Foreign and joint enterprises have been widely informed about the statutes of the edict and intend to make use of the benefits which it grants. Therefore, many of them continue to pay taxes at the old rates, refuse to pay the newly introduced taxes, etc. The local tax agencies are in a state of confusion. After all, they have not received any official written explanations in regard to the edict. However, if the tax agencies do not follow the statutes of the edict in the future and deem the application of the benefit to be illegal, then financial sanctions will be applied to the enterprises in a compulsory manner. The amounts of these sanctions are considerable, and therefore there is not much reason to hope that the foreign companies and joint ventures will quietly pay the fines and that the actions of the Russian tax agencies will not evoke a huge international repercussion. Which, of course, will have a negative effect on the process of investing funds into the Russian economy.

**Customs Order Exempting Imports From VAT**  
944Q0286A Moscow *PRAVO I EKONOMIKA*  
in Russian No 3, 15 Mar 94 p 14

["Order of the Russian Federation State Customs Committee No. 30 Dated 24 January 1994: On Exemption From the Payment of Value Added Tax for Goods Imported Into the Russian Federation"]

[Text] In implementation of Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 2270, dated 22 December 1993, "On Certain Changes in Taxation and the Interrelations of Budgets of Various Levels":

1. Effective 1 January 1994 the following will not be subject to value added tax during customs registration:

1.1. Goods imported into territory of the Russian Federation as contributions to the charter funds of enterprises with foreign investments within one year of the moment of their registration (Exemption Code 31);

1.2. Technological equipment, spare parts, and materials imported into Russian Federation territory that support the production of medical immunobiological preparations for the diagnostics, preventive care, and treatment of infectious diseases, preparations intended to fight epidemics (Exemption Code 32);

1.3. Goods and technological equipment imported into Russian Federation territory within the framework of gratuitous technical assistance provided by foreign states in accordance with intergovernmental agreements (Exemption Code 33);

1.4. Goods and technological equipment imported into Russian Federation territory in accordance with contracts with foreign organizations and firms for the conduct of joint scientific projects (Exemption Code 34);

1.5. Books and periodicals imported into Russian Federation territory (Exemption Code 35).

1.6. Training manuals and textbooks for educational institutions brought into the Russian Federation (Exemption Code 36).

2. Exemption from the payment of value added tax for goods imported into Russian Federation territory enumerated in subpoints 1.2-1.4, and 1.6 of this Order is afforded when instructions from the Russian State Customs Committee are on hand.

3. In connection with the entry into force of Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 2270, dated 22 December 1993, as pertains to the change in taxation procedure effective 1 January 1994, excess amounts of value added tax exacted are subject, at the will of the taxpayer, to accreditation to an account for future payments or to return from customs depositary accounts.

[Signed] First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Customs Committee V. Kruglikov

#### Customs Order Amending Excise Rates for Imports

944Q0286B Moscow PRAVO I EKONOMIKA in Russian No 3, 15 Mar 94 p 14

["Order of the Russian Federation State Customs Committee No. 70 Dated 21 February 1994: Partial Changes to the Excise Tax Rates for Import of Goods Into Russian Federation Territory"]

[Text] With the aim of implementing Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 116, dated 14 February 1994, "On the Introduction of Changes to Certain Decisions of the Russian Federation Government":

1. The following changes shall be introduced to Point 1 of Order of the Russian State Customs Committee No. 501 dated 26 November 1993:

Commodity Nomenclature of Foreign Economic Activity code	Abbreviated commodity designation	Excise tax rate (percent)
220710000	Undenatured ethyl alcohol, alcoholic content not less than 80 percent by volume	400
220820100, 220820900	Strong alcoholic beverages obtained as a result of distillation (rectification) of vineyard wine or rape	200
220830	Whiskey	250
220840	Rum and tafia	250
220850	Gin and other juniper-flavored liqueurs	250
220890110, 220890190	Arrack	250
220890310, from 220890390	Vodka	250
220890910, 220890990	Undenatured ethyl alcohol, alcoholic content less than 80 percent by volume	400

2. Excise tax rates are not changed for commodities subject to excise tax not indicated in Point 1 of this Order.

3. The excise tax rates established by this Order shall be applied as of the date of publication of Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 116 dated 14 February 1994.

[Signed] First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Customs Committee V. Kruglikov



## KAZAKHSTAN

### Court Invalidates Local Election Results

944K1084A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 12 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "Elected Somewhat Dishonestly..."]

[Text] The silence of the mass media on the subject of the past elections does not at all mean that the subject has been settled and that people are satisfied with the very peculiar Central Election Commission interpretation of the concept of democracy. Up to the present time, many of the candidates whose civic equality was infringed are attempting to defend their constitutional rights, legality, and justice with the help of the Procuracy in people's courts and the Constitutional Court. But the voters are supporting those who despaired, got tired, and understood the lack of promise of these efforts with sympathetic and stimulating telephone calls; they say, after all, we believed in you, and we participated in the elections only for your sake...

Popular wisdom says that a drop of water grinds a stone. And, apparently, the people in their wisdom are always correct. Because a miracle almost happened: In the end, the people's court in one election district declared the elections invalid.

This is a precedent, and it is worth discussing in greater detail. It seems that back on 9 March the Tyulkubas District commission for District No. 134 composed an act that declared the elections in the district invalid. It checked for two days the statement of candidate M. Mermankulov concerning a prejudiced attitude toward him on the part of precinct commissions in Kazgurt'skiy Rayon and established that actually in their calculations the precinct commissions reduced the number of votes given to him in one case by 21, in another—by 39, and in a third—by 17, etc. This was verified in a spot check with the opening of a package of ballots of a total of six precincts, and in all six similar "reductions" were permitted; moreover, not only were Mermankulov's votes reduced, but also those of all the other candidates from the six who were running, except for the deputy chief of the Kazgurt'skiy Rayon administration, A. Kubeyev.

The district commission did not begin to confirm whether this was done intentionally or accidentally, considering this not to be in its jurisdiction. Therefore it limited itself only to the direct guidance of Article 65 of the Code on Elections, which concerns violations in vote counting—it declared the elections invalid.

It must be assumed that this decision did not come easily to the district commission.

From the information given by the district commission to the people's court: "In a spot check opening of packages of ballots, violations committed by precinct commissions in counting votes were disclosed. In six precincts the number of votes given to Mermankulov was artificially reduced

almost by 180. Great doubt was also raised by the fact that almost one-third of the ballots were not folded in half before they were dropped into the ballot boxes. For this, it was necessary to conduct a special expert analysis. After discovering the indicated violations, the district commission approached the Central Election Commission for advice. A.I. Artamanov, secretary of the Central Election Commission, proposed displaying more independence. After this, the commission decided to declare the elections invalid and refused to sum up the voting in the entire district..."

It is a great pity that such a clear indication of civic courage becomes the property of the public only now, a month after the peak of the events. Otherwise we would have long ago been able somehow to get and publish the decree of the Central Election Commission of 15 March. This decree has historical significance for our young sovereign state, because it lays out the "theory of partial pregnancy." The voter, after all, is a crowd, a primitive mass, a woman can be pregnant or not pregnant, and elections can be honest or falsified. But according to the theory of the Central Election Commission, the tally of votes can be not quite honest, with massive falsifications, but at the same time not have an effect on the election results. How is this? Here is a quotation from the decree of the Central Election Commission:

"As the checkup showed, the precinct election commission committed technical errors in counting the votes with respect to all the candidates included on the voting ballot. However, they did not influence the outcome of the elections.

"The Central Election Commission decrees:

"1. To cancel the decree of the district election commission on the elections of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Tyulkubas Election District No. 134 'On Declaring the Elections Invalid.'

"2. To declare the elections in the Tyulkubas Election District No. 134 of the South-Kazakhstan Oblast valid.

"To instruct the district election commission to sum up the elections."

This long quote from the decree is given here especially so that our reader can catch the iron character of the Central Election Commission from its tone and style and its absolutely firm will. Its decrees regarding the legally unregistered candidates did not at one time distinguish themselves with such firmness, and were only in the nature of a recommendation.

But now once again from the report of the district commission to the people's court: "The district commission responded to all telephone instructions of the Central Election Commission to tally the votes with a refusal. Only after written instructions of the Central Election Commission of 15 March 1994, and under pressure from the supervisory workers of the oblast administration, did the district commission depart with its materials to Kazgurt'skiy Rayon, where in fact the precinct commissions themselves were checking their own results of the

voting, and it is very difficult to make a judgment about their objectivity. But it is on the basis of these results that the summing up was not conducted until 17 March 1994."

Is it worth commenting on anything in this quotation? No. After all, to the editorial staff the reader is not a primitive mass at all. He will understand everything even without a commentary. And he will reach his own conclusions.

We will only add a little information. The candidates whose rights were infringed upon have filed a complaint against the Central Election Commission with the soviet rayon people's court of the city of Almaty under the chairmanship of I. Baygesiyev, and the materials and circumstances of the elections in the 134th District have been examined. Many facts were revealed indicating the ingenuity of the administration when it becomes necessary to resolve problems in its own interests. For example, elders came from the village of Sharankhan of Kazgurtskiy Rayon and talked about the great "concern" shown for the villagers during the elections. Just before the elections, members of the precinct commission came to their village, went to all the homes, and asked all the adults to sign lists of voters. At the same time, they did not offer to fill out ballots. And they explained that it would not be necessary to go to any elections after this...

I think that it was not easy for Judge I. Baygesiyev to reach a decision on the elections in the 134th Election District. However, could it have turned out any other way, given the aforementioned testimony of the elders? Even under the heaviest pressure? Probably not. Facts are a stubborn thing.

M. Mermankulov, who succeeded in making the first breach in the blind wall of lies and illegality, is a former author of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. He has written articles in the newspaper about the need to establish a single investigative committee, and he was and remains among those who are against corruption. I wanted to meet with him and congratulate him on his victory. But the meeting had to be postponed. After all, the decision of the court on the invalidity of the results of the elections in the 134th District was adopted back on 5 April, but the Central Election Commission has still not uttered even a sound in this regard: It has not made a decision, it has not commented on the case for the press, and it has not disclosed its own profound feelings with respect to the falsifications.

Will the Central Election Commission suddenly ignore the whole Tyulkubas story as if it did not happen? As it has until now ignored many cases of violations of the law. We should obviously wait a little before congratulations.

#### **Economic Development Course Examined**

*944K1067A Almaty ABV in Russian 8 Apr 94 p 6*

[Dialogue between Sergey Volkov, editor of the analysis section of the newspaper ABV, and Mikhail Ustyugov, editor of the economics section of the newspaper EKSPRESS K: "It Seems the Asphalt Is Melting With the Last Snow. Whatever the Demand for Democracy—Such Will Be the Supply"]

[Text] [Volkov] Regardless of how much the subject of elections may set our teeth on edge recently, we will have to say something about them, summing up the March results. As predicted, voter activity turned out to be the lowest in recent decades. Although in terms of this indicator we are still probably "ahead of the rest of the planet," social apathy is clearly on the rise in Kazakhstan. But if in developed countries slow activity in the electoral precincts is explained by the lack of confidence in politicians as a class (they say that without them they could figure out their problems), in our country this phenomenon has a different subtext. Here the people are tired of political games and, the main thing, they do not believe in the possibility of stabilizing the situation with the help of new deputies.

The passivity of a certain part of the population has indirectly "supported" the executive power, which from the very beginning without beating around the bush has taken to slipping in (there is no other word for it) people it wants or finds helpful. Of course, such a policy could not fail to evoke hostility from certain voters who were already weary of mindlessly obeying the powers that be.

[Ustyugov] Here are some characteristic figures obtained as a result of a sociological poll conducted by workers of the Republic Center for Study of Public Opinion. People of Kazakhstan were asked which problems bother them most today. Two-thirds answered: the decline of the standard of living. And only one out of 20 mentioned the lack of democratic freedoms. Whatever the demand for freedom—such is the supply. As a result, we have been given elections that are conducted, as the president put it, according to Kazakhstan's standards of democracy. Who is to blame for the fact that they turned out to be quite unlike the Western ones? There is American democracy, there is the general European standard, there is the Chinese, the Chilean, and there is Kazakhstan's. And ours is probably far from the worst, even if it did baffle CSCE experts. In any case a good half of the deputies (not counting those elected through the state list) were elected, in my view, without any violations or juggling of figures.

As for the activity of the electorate, the answer is provided again by the figures from the poll of the Republic Center for Study of Public Opinion. Only 7.5 percent of those questioned are counting on effective activity from the new legislative organ, and the rest think that the members of parliament engage partially in talkathons and partially in lofty abstractions that have nothing directly to do with real life, which is ruled not by laws but by local bureaucrats.

I do not know whether the sociologists were interested in the reaction of Kazakhstan residents to a possible turn toward authoritarian power, with complete elimination of the legislative branch, but I do not think they would respond with any special disturbance or misgivings here either: The past four months, during which the president has had additional authority and published edicts instead of signing laws, have shown the "elasticity" of Kazakhstan's democratic standards and the fact that they are not ingrained in the very essence of the political system, social life, and mentality of the citizens.

### The Fortress of Power and the 'Degree' of Loyalty

[Volkov] And still, in spite of the back-room games that have weeded out many politicians who were really needed in the Supreme Council, the new parliament will certainly not be in the government's pocket.

In the first place, certain deputies have remained from the preceding Supreme Council to join the current one, and the majority of them are extremely opposed to the policy being conducted today by the higher and middle echelons of power.

In the second place, no fewer if not more of the new members of parliament also share the aforementioned dislike for the actions of the government.

True, a part of the St. Petersburg corps is elected from the state or, more precisely, the president's list. Their position is unenviable. On the one hand, they were elected by the people and, quite naturally, must defend their interests. On the other, the fact that they were nominated by the head of state places on them certain moral (not to mention other) obligations to the president. This kind of duality (one might call it a "split personality") of a considerable number of the people's elect could undoubtedly play a self-destructive role in the new parliament. Add to this the division of the Supreme Council into two chambers (and many observers consider this all but a *fait accompli*) and it becomes clear that for the first time our deputies will be engaged in "slinging mud" at one another and the government at the same time. I think the former will still win out and the rest of the problems will be classified as internal parliamentary ones.

A distinguishing feature of March was the active preparation of certain people for posts in the Supreme Council. Today nobody any longer conceals the fact that Kuanysh Suyltanov should become the leader of one of the chambers of parliament. His conspicuous dismissal from the position of deputy prime minister because of "election to people's deputy" long before the beginning of the work of the first session was to have shown to the least quick-witted that this statesman had now seriously taken up the cause of building a new parliament.

[Ustyugov] The main task of the "script writers" who today are preparing the basis for the first session is to provide for a structure of the legislative organ and a mechanism for its activity that will enable the executive power to function freely. Parliament is to play a constructive-decorative role and nothing more. Above all it will be necessary to undertake a number of organizational measures aimed at holding back, dragging out, and "self-entanglement" of decisions that run counter to government policy. The complicated bicameral structure, the system of relations between the two chambers, and the regulations work to this end. Many a week will probably be devoted to these questions.

Otherwise the standoff between the powers would begin almost on the first day of the session. And what good does it do that the amount of the minimum wage and pension in the republic is approaching the value of one U.S. dollar?

They will call the prime minister to the podium and vote, say, for increasing the "minimum" to the value of the minimum consumer basket—400 tenge. The citizens will rejoice. Tomorrow they will all be given 10 times more money. The day after tomorrow all the prices will rise 10-fold. Will they summon the prime minister to the podium again?

I am not speaking about the republic budget, from which all benefits for war veterans, misplaced residents of the Aral Sea area, Semipalatinsk victims, Chernobyl victims, and those who suffered from the repressions have been eliminated. What kind of parliament would approve such a decision?

There is only one way out: Raise the "degree" of parliamentary loyalty, which will make it possible to assign to the president additional authority (in any case in the economic sphere) throughout the entire period of the "transition." Then the government will have its hands tied and the people's deputies will have it easier: There will be no need to waver between the Scylla and Charybdis of schism and disbandment.

### There Is More Room on Olympus

[Volkov] The personnel changes that occurred in March again evoked more questions than answers. The "reassignment" of Tulegen Zhukeyev from the position of state adviser to the vacant post of deputy prime minister with the present leapfrogging in functional duties of members of the government make it impossible to understand whether this was a reinforcement of a "weak section" in the administration of the state or a demotion of some ill-favored person (recall how some of the functions were "taken away" from the former state adviser), or simply a change of the official title of the position held by Mr. Zhukeyev, leaving him in charge of all the sections he had before. The customary curtain of complete secrecy over transfers like this leaves no chance of figuring out the real reasons for the aforementioned actions.

Nor does the discharge of Marat Ospanov from the position of the republic's chief tax collector because of his election as a deputy a month before the beginning of the work of the parliament provide an answer to the question of whether this is related to his forthcoming active work in the new Supreme Council or if there are some other factors at work here. It is no accident, probably, that President Sergey Tereshchenko recently said reproachfully that last year the tax services of Kazakhstan collected only 42 percent of the taxes that were due. Such "kindness" to the taxpayers at a time that is so difficult for the state budget cannot but make one wonder. With respect for Mr. Ospanov as a politician I still cannot but ask what actually were the reasons for his desire to be among the people's deputies again and why the republic leaders supported him in this. This question could be asked of several of those who were elected in March.

[Ustyugov] I can add only that Zhukeyev's appointment as deputy prime minister, from the standpoint of the Basic Law, reinforces his positions since nothing is said about



state advisers in the Constitution. I would not be surprised if the president eliminated the institution of state advisers altogether this year.

#### **We Have Too Few Fedorovs but Too Many Zaveryukhas**

[Volkov] March was also very instructive in the area of our leaders' outside contacts. The tendencies here are such that the Almaty leaders have already come up with a universal "lamentation." Bouncing along the pothole-filled highways of the capital (the impression was that the asphalt would melt along with the last snow), they say: If the president had not travelled abroad so frequently and had traveled on our roads, things would be easier for us. Let us overlook the concreteness of this complaint-request and discuss the principle of its origin. It is very good that both Nursultan Nazarbayev and the country he heads have a positive image abroad. It is even better that considerable amounts of funds in dollars are allotted to this country. But beyond that, as in the Soviet Union in Gorbachev's times, everything practically comes to a standstill. How, why, and where this money is spent—we do not know. A fresh example. Having concluded an agreement with the IMF and having received a guarantee that Kazakhstan would receive a large foreign currency loan, our government stated repeatedly that the money would be spent, among other things, for stabilizing exchange rate of the tenge and curbing inflation. In March we could see quite well how these intentions are being realized when on the eve of the elections the dollar was surging upward and by April Fool's Day it had doubled its tenge value. And that was in one month!

If things continue like this it will not be long before it will be possible to have another financial reform in order to reduce the scale of the republic's monetary unit. Such fantasies are nourished by the appearance in circulation of bills worth 200 tenge and the word from the president about his intention to buy from Great Britain special equipment on which our monetary bills are printed. If the former information evokes regret about such a rapid devaluation of the national currency (it is no joke that within four months after the monetary reform they will issue a denomination worth twice as much as the nominal value of the largest monetary bill!), the latter causes misgivings that soon the printing of tenge will turn into an uncontrolled process of issuing money that rapidly loses its value.

[Ustyugov] We do not have the appropriate political support for a stricter financial exchange rate in Kazakhstan. The Cabinet of Ministers is a monotonous, uniform monolith, and the struggle of approaches and concepts (if it exists at all) is left to the cadres. It is necessary to reveal (or create?) a multipolarity of government similar to the Russian: We must have our own Fedorovs who are ready to fall in battle against preferential credit and our own Zaveryukhas and Skokovs, who express the interests of the agro-industrial generals. But now one gets the impression that the government expresses only its own interests, which only it can understand, and therefore today it is capable of canceling out what it categorically

declared yesterday, and tomorrow it will no less resolutely return to the other side. And all this without conflicts, polemics, or resignations, with concerted, inspired enthusiasm. The result is that the general deterioration of the situation (and it is inevitable this year) is linked by the citizens not to concrete officials representing various ideas and interests but the government and president as a whole. Today the head of state must distance himself from the Cabinet of Ministers—beginning with separation of the staffs and ending with the appointment to the position of prime minister of a really respected strategist. Instead of this, Nazarbayev takes the "fire" himself, signing first populist and economically ideologized and then monetaristic-draconian decisions. There is an ancient truth that the more you take on, the more they ask of you. Appeals to create global conferences and alliances with supernational kopekks sound good on world-scale spaces, but they do not solve our internal problems.

#### **Do Not Grieve Over the Exchanges, Lads**

[Volkov] Kazakhstan is sometimes discussed in terms of a sad principle: Either something good or nothing at all. The decline of the production rates, the shutting down of hundreds of enterprises, and the nonpayments crisis have become typical phenomena. It would not be so bad if behind all this one could see positive tendencies in economic processes. Alas, even the documents the president and prime minister have signed, taking advantage of parliament's absence, give one no confidence that with their implementation our economy will reach any significant heights. Two recent edicts will serve as an example: "On Commodity Exchanges" and "On Measures for Forming Securities." Their adoption clearly shows that the country's leaders today are more interested in the problem of "staking out" as quickly as possible (before the beginning of the work of the Supreme Council) the basic points of their own economic policy than in actually implementing it. There has already been too much discussion of the sad fate of the Kazakhstan stock exchanges, which vanished not only because they were excessively numerous but also because of the fact that they were not included in the government schemes. So many lances, arrows, and other piercing writing implements have been broken over the creation of normal conditions for the formation of the securities market. Since it still does not exist, two legislative acts prepared by the executive power (another paradox of our legal thinking) will come out, and everyone is supposed to think that tomorrow everything will be okay in the corresponding areas of the economy. But in reality little will change as a result of the creation of state organs for questions of markets and securities (and these are the provisions that are the linchpins of these edicts), the more so taking into account the current degree of state influence over the economy. Why do these issues have to be raised again today? Is it really just in order to show that the executive power has its finger on the pulse of the reforms?

[Ustyugov] Incidentally, the government commission for developing the concept of the functioning of the securities market in Kazakhstan was created about two years ago and it seems that it has not convened once since then. Russia

has adopted hundreds of normative acts aimed at the formation and civilized regulation of this extremely important variable in a market economy. We are just beginning. Well, we can still console ourselves: Better late than never.

#### Changes in Law on Associations Proposed

944K1059A Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian 7 Apr 94  
p 3

[Article by Asylbek Abeldinov: "Amendments to the Law on Public Associations Are Required"]

[Text] More than 400 registered public associations operate in Kazakhstan. The majority of them have emerged in recent years. "Practice" requires the improvement of "theory": Lacunae in the legal base for the activity of parties, movements, associations, and such are obvious today. This is the subject of an article by Asylbek Abeldinov, member of the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan and candidate of legal sciences.

A most important sphere of public relations connected with realization of the right of the citizens to association is regulated by the Law "On Public Associations in the Kazakh SSR," which was adopted on 27 June 1991.

But very appreciable changes have occurred in the recent period. A new statehood is taking shape, and the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan has been adopted, which, in turn, requires current legislation to be brought into line with the provisions of the constitution and the development and detailing of constitutional provisions with regard to the requirements of current social practice.

A public-law mechanism of the realization of constitutional formulas should be created in order that on the one hand it really secure the rights and liberties of the citizen and, on the other, that the rights and liberties be realized inseparably from the obligations of the citizen, whose discharge is essential for the assurance of personal, public, and state interests.

In the context of what has been set forth there should, it would seem, be work done on the preparation of revisions and addenda to the legislation regulating the activity of public associations. It should be specified here that we are not talking only about the specific above-mentioned law. The problem, I believe, encompasses quite a wide range of legislative instruments. We have to raise the question of civil and economic and administrative and criminal legislation also.

A public association is an association of specific individuals which has arisen as the result of the voluntary, free, and conscious expression of the wishes of the citizens and which operates on the basis of the equality of its members, self-administration, legality, and glasnost. It should be added to this that an association is created on the basis of a community of interests of different individuals for the realization of their rights and liberties. The legal capacity of the public association as a legal entity arises only after the registration of its charter by an authorized official body in the procedure determined by legislation.

In other words, a salient feature of the institution in question is that it is uniquely "impregnated" with the ideas of legality, is based on the rights of man and citizen, and should constantly ensure observance of the obligations of both the public association and its members. None of these components should either fall by the wayside or be broken in the overall "chain" of activity of both the public association and each of its members in the composition of the latter.

But let us ponder: Are all these and other aspects connected with the functioning of the public associations regulated legislatively this scrupulously and in such broad envelopment. Perhaps not. Nor is this easy.

Account should be taken of the following aspects.

If a public association is a voluntary formation that has arisen as the result of the free expression of the wishes of the citizens united on the basis of a community of interests, then, logically, the citizens that are members of it delegate to the public association the right to control their behavior and actions in the name of the achievement of common goals and interests. Consequently, the purpose of the public association in this case is to ensure the formulation and determination of collective thought and collective actions within the framework of legality.

It is this "status" that should be stimulated by the official structures. I consider essential in this connection the development in current legislation of the provision enshrined in Article 53 of the constitution, according to which "the state ensures observance of the rights and legitimate interests of public associations."

But, as a study of the opinion of members of public associations shows, they do not always have a clear idea of what rights are accorded the public associations.

According to Article 18 (it is called "Rights of public associations") of the law on public associations, their rights are enshrined in their charters. At the same time, on the other hand, this cannot be understood in the literal meaning of the word. In other words, the charters should enshrine only rights clearly defined by the legislator. Which precisely? In accordance with the said article of the law (I quote verbatim): "For realization of the purposes and tasks determined in the charters, program documents, and other acts the public associations shall freely disseminate information concerning their purposes and activity and, in the instances and in the procedure specified by legislation, enjoy also the following rights:

"exercise legislative initiative in the person of their republic authorities (this right has become invalid inasmuch as it was not enshrined in the new constitution);

"represent and defend the legitimate interests of their members (participants) in state and public bodies;

"exercise other authority not conflicting with current legislation."

But other articles of the said law contain different rights also. Thus Article 19 specifies the right of public associations to create in the procedure established by law for the

purpose of achievement of the statutory tasks enterprises and financially autonomous organizations possessing the rights of legal entity. Article 20 lists in detail what the public associations may own. Article 21 enshrines their right to establish press organs and engage in publishing activity in accordance with legislation of the republic. Article 26 establishes the right of public associations to maintain international relations.

**The law lacks a precise definition of the obligations of public associations.** I believe it would be expedient in the interests of the unambiguous understanding and application of the enshrined provisions to unite all that has been enumerated above, say, within the framework of one article entitled "Rights and obligations of public associations."

Certain provisions of Article 11 of the law on public associations (it is called "Membership of (participation in) public associations") require the corresponding amplification or adjustment. Specifically, the provision of this article to the effect that **collective members** (the work force of enterprises, institutions, and organizations and citizens' associations) may, in addition to political parties and trade unions, take part in the activity of public associations would seem contentious, in my view.

This provision is contrary, in my opinion, to the very essence of the public association inasmuch as it is created on the basis of the conscious expression of the wishes of specific individuals personally undertaking to comply with the requirements of the charter. The principle of the equality of the members of the association is violated also (what kind of equality can there be, you will agree, between the individual and the collective member). I cannot imagine what kind of "general" community of interests as a whole of the work force of this enterprise or institution or the other there could be. Especially if these are not political purposes and not professional interests (as we have already said, political parties and trade unions cannot by law have collective members).

One public association's collective membership of another gives rise to questions also. In this case, logically, the members and organs of administration of the first association should be guided in their activity by both their own charter and the charter of the association they have joined as a collective member. It transpires here that for some individual members there will be "dual" requirements, rights and obligations, and so forth, so to speak, for others, not. There is formally once again a violation of the principle of the equality of individual members. In addition, the constitutional principle of the equality of the legal possibilities of public associations is violated also.

But, as an analysis shows, there are many examples of public associations which have, indeed, registered in the procedure established by law uniting on a voluntary basis in unions of public associations. This is characteristic particularly of cultural and educational and artistic public associations.

This right of the public associations is specified by Article 9 of the law.

But clarification is required here, in my view. Inasmuch as the citizens' associations creating the union have their own registered charters, they should unite in a union as subjects of the latter. In other words, a union (new formation) should not interfere in the intra-statutory activity of its subjects, should not decide questions of membership in them, and so forth inasmuch as it is not individual members of different public associations that are uniting in a new one but associations of citizens as a whole that are uniting for the joint achievement of the common purposes of different associations.

A union of associations does not have individual members directly: each association independently determines the procedure and conditions of membership in it and the rights and obligations of its members, that is, its "internal life." These clarifications should be made to the current law.

It has to be acknowledged that our legislation absolutely does not regulate the procedure or conditions of the formation and functioning on the territory of the republic of structural subdivisions of international public (nongovernment) associations and the public associations of other states. I would like to share my thoughts in this connection.

**First.** The head associations should be registered according to the whereabouts of their headquarters and, consequently, present to the authorized official body of Kazakhstan a copy of evidence (certificate) of registration of the charter (regulations) and the actual charter of this association certified in the established procedure.

**Second.** The purposes and tasks of the activity of this association must not conflict with the constitution or legislation of our state.

**Third.** An undertaking by the head of the diplomatic representation of the specific state to the effect that the activity of the structural subdivision of a public associations of this state will not be exercised to the detriment of the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan is essential.

**Fourth.** A structural subdivision of such associations should have its own charter adopted and registered in our state in accordance with the legislation of the latter.

**Fifth.** Supervision of the activity of the structural subdivisions of such public associations should be exercised in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

But the main condition I consider the following: The sponsors of the formation and leaders of the organs of administration of such structural subdivisions should be only citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the right of citizens of other states to participate in the work of such organizations not being excluded here.

And how to determine the status of a public association: Will it be an international, republic, regional, or local association?

Things are today reaching the point of absurdity. If the sponsors of the creation of a public association want to register its charter with a declaration of its republic status,



the statutory activity of the citizens' association must, as Article 7 of the law declares, extend even prior to registration of its charter to the territory of all or a majority of oblasts of the republic.

And according to Article 13, what is more, it is necessary within one month from the day that the charter is adopted (and the association is formed, consequently) to have submitted a declaration to the appropriate authorized official body with the enclosure of material confirming the territory of dissemination of the activity of the association and other material necessary for registration of the charter.

This "severity" of legislative prescription hardly corresponds to the interests of the cause or a strengthening of legality in the activity of the public associations.

Which is what I would like to propose.

The authorized official body registering the charter of a public association should, evidently, determine the specific timeframe within which the association, after registration of its charter, is required to present to this body documents on the creation of its structural subdivisions on the territory of the corresponding oblasts and their registration in the procedure established by law. In the event of noncompliance with this condition, the same official body should cancel its decision on registration of the charter.

The soundness of the current practice, when one and the same body, the Ministry of Justice, for example, undertakes the preliminary consultation on questions of the formation of public associations and itself performs the registration, would seem contentious, in my view. It would be more expedient for these to be different bodies. Some should hold the consultations, say, others, undertake the official registration of the charters of public associations. A practice has taken shape currently whereby the same specialists render advisory assistance and present the findings in respect to the documents for registration of the charters prepared on the basis of their advice.

It would be expedient for the activity of political parties to be regulated by a special law. The point being that the current law on public associations determines merely the procedure and conditions of formation and also membership of political parties. I believe that this is insufficient inasmuch as the law should not only prohibit or authorize but regulate specific activity and adjust particular legal relationships.

I would believe expedient in this connection the adoption of a public associations code with the inclusion in it of the laws on public associations, on freedom of religion and religious associations, and on the trade unions, which have already been adopted and which are operating, and also the proposed new law on political parties.

#### **Commentary on New State Broadcasting Plan** 944K1064A Almaty ABV in Russian 8 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Viktor Verk: "RKTRK—...There Is No Alternative"]

[Text] *A Japanese sociologist once said: "With the development of television, Japan will be transformed into a country*

*of 100 million fools." In our Homeland the situation is much better—at least the population and its growth rates give us hope: The fate of the Japanese does not threaten us.*

The president's edict of 5 April "On the Creation of the Republic Corporation 'Television and Radio of Kazakhstan' [RKTRK]" was a surprise to those in the know. The fact is that the former State Television and Radio Company Kazakhstan, in the hands of its chairman Sherkhan Murtaza, has long held its rightful place in the country's information space, properly performing its role as a mouthpiece for state policy. And the proposed rules of the game were unquestioningly accepted on the other side of the screen: The majority of Kazakhstan television viewers took advantage of the services of commercial television channels, tuning in to State TV only in extraordinary situations (the introduction of the national currency, price increases, earthquakes, etc.).

Recently a certain amount of excitement among the viewers was caused by the election of Mr. Murtaza to the professional parliament, in connection with which the candidacy of his successor was actively discussed. But in fact everything turned out not to be so simple. Even from the first point of the president's edict it follows that the upstart "telemonster" will dominate the republic air waves, since it is being created "as a part of the State Television and Radio Company Kazakhstan, and also other enterprises and organizations included in it on a voluntary basis." According to certain preliminary information, TAN and KTK [expansions not indicated] intend to merge with RKTRK (nothing is known so far about the other commercial channels). Be that as it may, it is TAN and KTK that are the most popular among television viewers of the capital today. And if the "statization" of the former is not especially surprising, taking into account the appointment to Murtaza's position of the former TAN chief, Leyla Beketova-Khrapunova, the mooring at that same dock of the ship of Mr. Fidel looks somewhat strange. In a word, in a country where the three branches of power do not always manage to separate themselves from one another, this kind of symbiosis within the fourth should come as no surprise.

And, judging from certain nuances, they did not come up with this alliance just yesterday. According to unverified information from sources close to the leadership of the former Gosteleradio, the draft of the aforementioned edict was prepared at the end of last year. And after the official electronic press, precisely in keeping with the scenario, won the role allotted to it in the election campaign, the document was blessed with the president's signature.

Observers regard this innovation as another step to the achievement of the cherished dream of domestic authorities: agreement of opinion that is "democratic" in form and authoritarian (at best) in content. If in addition to all this they manage to realize the age-old plan of the "higher-ups," to organize Russian-language broadcasting on the Russian channel, the television viewers will very soon be

able to see the irony of the well-known commercial: With all the wealth of choice there is no alternative...

## TURKMENISTAN

### Turkmen Area Railroad Development Planned

944E0683A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 2 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by D. Kurbanov: "The New Railroads of Turkmenia"]

[Text] In connection with the plans to develop Turkmenia, the railroad workers of this state have been faced with the task of further rebuilding existing lines and constructing new ones.

The interests, let us say, of the Balkan Velayat—a region with tremendous reserves of oil, salt, iodine, bromine and hard coal—require an exit, not only to the center of the country, but also to the north. It is planned to run new branch lines from Gazandzhyk (Kazandzhyk) to the open-pit mines of Gyzylgaya (Kyzylkaya) (about 150 kilometers) and from Krasnovodsk (now the city of Turkmenbashi) to the salt developments.

A mainline track to the Turkmen subtropics has already been laid from the Gazandzhyk Station to the south. This is needed for development of Turkmenistan's agriculture. Several harvests a year may be obtained here with an approach to the subtropic area of the Amu-Darya waters along the Karakum Canal (this project is already being carried out successfully). On the other hand, the branch line from Gazandzhyk to the border settlement of Gyzylatrek (Kyzylatrek), over 300 kilometers long, will be an alternative, a second link of the Trans-Asian mainline, with an exit to Iran and Turkey. In this case, about 80 kilometers of rails remain to be laid from the Turkmen border to the closest station in Iran.

To the northeast of Turkmenistan, the Dashkhovuz (Gashauz) Station will be further developed and will become the country's major new railroad junction. The Dashkhovuz Velayat is a major producer of agricultural goods: grain, rice, cotton, sesame, raw silk and karakul sheep. Last year alone the supply of fresh vegetables from

Dashkhovuz by the inhabitants of Ashgabat made it possible to reduce the urgency of the "vitamin" problem several-fold. Motor vehicle transport between the north and the capital of the republic, however, is expensive. The prices for Dashkhovuz tomatoes and cabbage are very high.

A branch line is now being constructed in Dashkhovuz from the Koneurgench Station to the small town of Kerney. It is possible that a mainline by-passing the Uzbek territory will soon have to be built from the Dashkhovuz Station, since this section, up to the junction station of Gazochag (Gazochak), for the time being has strained relations with the Central Asian section—primarily because of disputes about the engineering shoulders for locomotive traffic and about safeguarding freight.

It is planned to run another branch along the left bank of the Amu-Darya from Chardzhev (Chardzhou) to Kerki, along the motor-railroad bridge to the Amu-Darya Station. The communicating road is now cut off from the area of medium flow of the Amu-Darya. Thanks to the new branch line, it will become faster and more reasonable to transport sulfur, potassium salt, marble, cotton and grain from the southeastern raw materials "corner" to the center of the country.

Large reserves of valuable raw material have been discovered in the eastern, Lebap Velayat. The future mainline from Chardzhev to Kerki must therefore be linked up with the presently operating branch line from Mary to Gushga (Kushka). This "ring" will make it possible for Turkmenistan to exit through Afghanistan and Pakistan to ports on the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

To a certain extent, all the plans are being implemented today. Dozens of kilometers have already been laid in all directions. Work on laying a road to the border town of Sarakhs is particularly intensive: almost the entire 120-kilometer roadbed and 50 kilometers of mainline tracks have been constructed. The road is, of course, experiencing a shortage of rails and ties, and does not have enough construction equipment, but things are moving. The outlines of a developed transport structure for Turkmenia are gradually appearing.

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